

THE GREAT DECEPTION

BRINGING INTO THE LIGHT THE
REAL MEANING AND MANDATE
OF THE HARDING VOTE
AS TO PEACE

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THE GREAT DECEPTION

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THE GREAT DECEPTION

CHAPTER I.

FINDING OUR BEARINGS.

I WILL put my foreword in a chapter of the book where it will be likely to be read and will do the most good.

The word “deception” in the title is used in this volume only in rare instances in its strictest sense, as implying deliberate purpose to deceive. The misleading of many minds in the case we are about to present may be compared to one of nature’s deceptions, as when a stroller in unexplored fields, perhaps not far from his own home, sees in miasmatic clouds in the lowlands a stretch of beautiful water bestudded with islands while mountain shores rise beyond, and is ready to aver that he has looked upon one of the most enchanting scenes to be found in any landscape, only to look an hour later when the mists have cleared, to be surprised to learn that the actual scene is very different, presenting no islands and no water.

Had the stroller returned to his own side of the mountain without taking that later look, he would

very innocently have entertained his neighbors with the story of an enrapturing scene just beyond, of which they had never heard or dreamed, to be hailed by some as a most fortunate wanderer while others who knew would accuse him of baseless fabrication.

A strange combination of much cloud and some real land, aided in the minds of some by a great desire and much expectation that it might be so, has tricked many of our citizens into a great and very injurious misconception of the meaning of the election result and turned them into innocent and thoroughly earnest deceivers of others.

It is true of some of the most zealous and successful of these deceivers that they are possessed of a powerful and not disinterested motive to propagate the deception of which they have been more than willing victims, since in a certain way they and their cause receive large benefits from it. But I will not here charge them with malignant or deliberate purpose to deceive.

It is also true that the first implanting of that deception came in part, through a strange commingling of sincerity and hidden motive which had in it some of the elements of deception in the strict sense of the word, as will appear in one of our chapters.

In these limited senses, and in some rare instances in the stricter sense that of which I am to write is indeed *the great deception*, and the title is justified by more than literary license.

It is to drive away the deceiving mists that obscure

the real landscape that the following pages have been written.

Is there in the minds of many citizens and of many statesmen of both the greater political divisions, and particularly in the minds of the politicians, a very grave misinterpretation of the meaning of the phenomenal vote which made Senator Harding President—a misinterpretation that is liable to affect seriously if not disastrously the action of the government upon the question of world union for peace, and which communicated from one to another has come to be in effect, though not in general with intention, a great deception which is befogging the political atmosphere of the land?

Many believe that there is—and that there is great need as well as promise for some one to present the easily discerned facts that should correct that misinterpretation in any reasonable and unbiased mind.

Accepting that pleasant and really delightful task, I am sure of having interested readers, for not only the average citizen but much more our statesmen and more than any others our politicians, if by any chance they may have acquired a wrong conception of the meaning of that vote, should wish to be put right. Since it is not a question of opinion but of fact and it is of very great importance that the statesmen know, while it is the very life of the politician to know what the people are thinking and much more what they believe, may I not hope that they as well as the non-political citizen, will listen to me long enough to learn if I am presenting anything

worth attention. I will at least hope to set them to thinking.

No one of any consequence wishes to misinterpret or continue a victim of deception as to the meaning of the vote. But it would be very natural if a man who has interpreted it wrongly and in the direction of his own inclinations and is strongly committed to a course which that misinterpretation supports, should listen with small patience to a contrary view, though it be much to his interests to give it fair consideration and due weight. Of such I would ask that for pure self-interest, if for no better reason, preference be held in restraint and fair weight be given to what is herein offered.

I am offering no plea that we enter the League of Nations, either with or without reservations or revision, though the vote seems to be for it Americanized. There may be something better, and more, I prefer something different.

I will go so far as to admit that the administration may be justified in going counter to the plain mandate of the election, if it be true that new developments in Europe show that to heed that mandate might result in injury and disaster. Indeed it may be the President's imperative obligation to the people to disobey their mandate, given under different conditions from those that now exist.

But it would be most unfortunate if he or the Senate or other national leaders should hold an entirely wrong conception of what that mandate really was,

and in obedience to that wrong conception seek to put into effect a mandate which was never given.

The intent and effort of this volume is to contribute something which will help to guard against the possibility of any such mistake. It is to clear the atmosphere of the fog of misrepresentation or misinterpretation of the people's will as expressed in the late election to the end that, unhindered by a mistaken belief in a mandate which the people never intended to give, our statesmen may work out, solely upon its merits with every collateral consideration fully weighed, the best possible plan to bring about the great consummation towards which the hearts of men and women the world over are turned with infinite longing.

We know what that is. It is the realization of something—whether its name be League or Association or Permanent Court of International Justice—which shall give a reasonable assurance to mankind that, in any respect approaching the magnitude in which this generation has suffered it, there shall be no more war.

As to the part America is to play in that consummation—as to the plan to be worked out and adopted—the responsibility is with new and able leaders. The friends of peace look to them with some anxiety and much hope. In general they have faith in President Harding and his administration. They believe that the patriotism and international good-will of the American people and the constructive statesmanship of the party in power supported by broad-

mindful statesmen of the opposing party, will find the way to that realization without the sacrifice of American independence or any precious American interest.

Whatever the plan which is finally adopted, if it receives the sanction of the statesmanship of the world, should not all reasonable and rightminded men give it cordial support?

If the facts, which this little volume will attempt to line up in their proper relation, mean what I believe them to mean and that meaning is understood and accepted by the American people, no small coterie of obstructionists in the Senate will be able to bring to their side such support as will put it in their power to defeat this administration when, with intention to fulfil the promises found alike in the party record and platform and his own spoken words, President Harding shall seek the required two-thirds Senate vote to ratify a union with other nations for the saving of civilization and the preservation of world peace.

On the other hand, a wide acceptance of the wrong interpretation of the meaning of that vote shrewdly put out by the foes of peace and aided by the most remarkably camouflaged propaganda ever known, would put into their hands a powerful instrument with which they may be able to defeat any effort of the President to lead us either into the existing League with such reservations or revision as will make it conform to American standards, or into a new association of nations that shall in any worthy

degree meet the aspirations and hopes of mankind.

Frankly and precisely it is to defeat that attempt against the President and the American people that this book has been written—and in the very grave peril that just that may happen through a wrong interpretation, consists the very great and immediate importance of the question we are discussing.

If this writing instead of being a presentation of facts in the history of a movement and of a misunderstanding, was intended to be an argument, the author would not argue for our entry into the League of Nations, if for no other reason, because there appears to be little if any hope for it under this administration and it is with this administration we have to do. But more than that, he is prepared to believe, and two years ago believed and expressed the belief in a pamphlet, that the ultimate realization must be a creation much better than the League of Nations, which will be explained later on. But the damaging lie of the false interpretation of the vote must be slain before there can be the better realization or anything else worthy of American statesmanship and the American people, for it is being diligently used to discredit and defeat, not the League of Nations only, but our entry into any society of nations whatever for the preservation of peace.

If the League of Nations was voted down nothing was voted to take its place. Thus would statesmen justify themselves in inaction. To defeat that betrayal I do contend for the League in the event noth-

ing else adequate to the task of preserving world peace is achieved, and I would have the public mind in readiness for it if the world situation or any failure to achieve something better or as good should at any time bring us back to it. In the final chapter I also suggest a temporary use of it as a very useful stepping stone to the better and greater realization which alone will answer the need of mankind.

The immediate usefulness of a full and fair discussion of this subject is not to insure on the one hand that we enter the existing League or on the other hand that a new association of nations be formed. It is to make certain that we do *something* effective for the prevention of war,—something to put the great influence of the United States actively and *permanently* on the side of peace preservation.

It may serve a useful purpose if in this chapter, designed to be preparatory to entering upon our real subject in which we will make a good advance in the next chapter, we remind the friends of world peace who are voicing opposition and severe advance criticism of President Harding, that it should be perfectly plain that whatever may now be obtained in the way of our union with other nations for the preservation of peace can come only through him. Would it not therefore be well to work *with* him and not against him? On the other hand, no one knows better than he that to attempt something and fall short of achieving what will be permanently effective to preserve world peace, will write failure over his

administration and disappoint the keenest desire of our people and an expectant world.

Along with the question,—For what did Republicans vote, will be entwined in the remaining pages the pro-League Republican viewpoint and attitude, for it will be found that the two are remarkably involved.

We are now almost ready to consider the meaning or mandate of the Republican vote in the national election. But before we can intelligently consider that question, it is necessary to ask and answer another question, namely this,—who may properly be classed as in the list of Republican voters?

In support of the Republican ticket there were the German-American and pro-German voters whose vote was for Germany. There were the Irish-American and anti-British voters who voted for Ireland, for however much we may sympathize with the aspirations of the Irish people, we must admit that a very small percentage of that vote was Republican or will be Republican in future elections. They voted for Ireland. In the Republican mass-meetings, whatever else they seemed to applaud they clapped and shouted for Ireland, and the German and pro-German cheered for Germany. They were there for the purpose of doing their very best for Germany and for Ireland. They have themselves so impressed it upon the American mind that there is no easy escape from that conclusion. It must be admitted that they were not distinctly Republican nor all-American.

Added to these in support of Harding's election

were the Wilson haters and League haters of other than the Republican party, and to these must be added the enemies of all government, and so particularly enemies of the administration then in power, which in its very effort to please had offended them, and which they wished to hit. These were also bitter enemies of the League, which stood in the way of all they desired.

They attended the more radical Republican meetings and added to the anti-League shout and on election day voted another ticket. They were not Republican nor at all American. They will never be Republican nor vote the Republican ticket.

These various elements which we may describe as the pros and antis, made most and in many instances practically all of the "scrap the League" applause in the meetings, and before that time the larger part of the irreconcilable vote in the Republican primaries.

At the risk of drawing the charge of repetition (a risk which I never hesitate to take when it will aid to clear understanding) I will add, it should be kept in mind that in these acts they were not Republicans and particularly that a very large proportion of them will not be Republicans in future elections.

We know, of course, that there are a large number of Germans who are consistent Republicans. But they were not acting as Republicans upon these occasions. We know there are Irishmen who adhere to the Republican party, but they were not Republicans in the acts we have cited. It is true of both the Ger-

mans and Irish that in those meetings they had little thought of the Republican party or of the United States of America, except as they might be used to advance the interests of the Fatherland or of the Emerald Isle.

Undoubtedly there were many genuine Republican voters honestly opposed to the entire idea of the League and also to any League and equally to any association of nations. But the number of these was at the time of the election relatively small.

There was and is a much larger number who may be termed Republicans who do little political thinking for themselves. Their exact Republican position is to be found where they think the leaders point and whither they think the crowd is going. Without doubt an increasing number of these, as the campaign went on, swayed by the anti-League enthusiasm of the meetings, which they did not and could not distinguish as principally pro-German and anti-British, became increasingly opposed to the League of Nations or to anything that the irreconcilable orators could anathematize under the name of "entangling alliance" be it League or association of nations.

Excluding these, not a very large and certainly not the thinking, the deliberate and therefore not the dominant or better influence in the party, we reach the all-American and all-Republican vote. It is to the interpretation of the meaning of this, the real and unquestionably Republican vote that we are to devote our next chapter.

Before proceeding to that interpretation permit me to say that there can be no fair presentation of the question from the Republican viewpoint without criticism, either direct or implied, of our former President Wilson, which the writer would avoid if he could. But it will be observed that that criticism is in this volume confined to only one thing—his failure to accept a compromise that would have put us into his own League of Nations at either of the two critical moments when his consent was all that was needed to make the League with the United States a member of it a realized and beneficent fact.

That criticism is an expression of opinion and opinion is not fact. The writer admits that he may be wrong in the opinion that in that act or failure to act, President Wilson lost a noble cause and subjected himself to the charge of yielding to an impracticable idealism when he might, by acceptance, have realized the better half of his great ideals without the least sacrifice of principle, and having thus secured to the world the better half, could continue the fight for the other half with a larger chance to succeed and without the risk to lose all.

Of the peril of that risk he was not without earnest and importunate warning*

If events prove Mr. Wilson to have been right, the author will rejoice to confess himself wrong. But there is no doubt that his uncompromising position, whether right or wrong, influenced pro-League Re-

* See Addenda.

publican opinion and action in the way which will appear as we proceed, and that is the essential point in its bearing upon the question we have under consideration.

It may be that an inscrutable Providence will bring out of the unwisdom of his act, if it was unwise, a better and greater realization of the world's hopes than his idealistic vision had conceived.*

Since my presentation is avowedly from the Republican viewpoint, I do not expect my Democratic friends to fully agree with me—and they have the same right to their view that I have to mine. But they will accept the inevitable conclusions which the facts I bring in review arbitrarily and imperiously enforce.

* NOTE: For his own satisfaction, the author, under the title, "Woodrow Wilson—An Appreciation and A Criticism," is expressing in a page in the Addenda, what that title may be assumed to imply.

CHAPTER II.

WHY PRO-LEAGUE REPUBLICANS VOTED FOR HARDING AND THEIR PRESENT ATTITUDE.

WE are now ready to take a new and very important beginning. Let us begin with understanding. Thus we will avoid dispute by the way. Having in the preceding chapter separated from the actual Republican vote those who in their support of Senator Harding voted, as they believed, in the interests of Germany, and those who, as they believed, voted in the interests of Ireland, and thus in the act of voting were not Republican or all-American, we are now prepared to ask the question, the answer to which will aid to harmonious understanding—What do we mean by the term “pro-League Republicans”?

The term pro-League Republicans as used in the caption to this chapter, is intended to include the distinctively Republican voters for President Harding who may be divided into three classes in respect to the terms of the possible entry of the United States into the League of Nations, one favoring our entry without reservation, another with mild reservations, and the third with the Lodge reservations—which latter almost the entire party came finally to accept.

We might therefore properly revert to a sub-title which was suggested as a substitute for the one used on the title page, “Why *Ten Million* Pro-League Republicans Voted for Harding,” which would be modest when we consider the broad sense in which the term is correctly used, that is, to include all Republicans who at the time of the election favored our entry into the League upon any terms.

A very large number of the voters heartily tired and confused by the long drawn out discussion of nearly two years, felt little if any interest in the question and supported the ticket upon other issues. Many thoroughly dissatisfied with the then existing administration in many particulars, were anxious to be rid of it and all its influences. Many more supported the ticket merely because they were Republicans and always supported it.

With none of these have we any concern in this writing. We are merely seeking to discover what decided the support of those who did care, and whose votes were influenced by it and are therefore entitled to be counted in the determination of the meaning or mandate of the vote upon that question.

Having now reached intelligent understanding we are prepared for the question,—Why did pro-League Republicans anxious to see the entry of our country into the League of Nations upon some basis of agreement, who for nearly two years consistently urged that we enter the League either with the Lodge or some other reservations, vote to make Senator Harding President and restore the Republican party to

control of the government? Why did they do that though the party leaders had been charged with obstructing and in fact defeating our entry into the League and Senator Harding had declared against "going in," while his opponent Governor Cox, appealed for support as the League's champion?

A brief answer would be to say that, beside the fact that they were Republicans, they had become thoroughly disappointed by the failure of the then existing Democratic administration to bring to accomplishment anything at all in the way of our actual union with other nations for the preservation of peace, and by its obstinate refusal to permit our country to enter the League of Nations by the only way which at any time had been possible, and they wanted a change.

The only way by which that administration could at any time have made our entry possible was by acceptance of the Senate reservations, the compromise between the McCumber and the Lodge groups in the Senate which would have left in full force in the Covenant of the League of Nations more than will now or perhaps ever be put into it with American support.

Those reservations would have left intact in the compact the economic boycott against war as provided in Article XVI, the most powerful instrument in all the Covenant for the preservation of peace, the one most ready for use and which avoids all the sacrifices of war, together with other important provisions chief of which are those for the creation of a

code of international laws, the erection of a Permanent Court of International Justice and qualified provisions for arbitration and disarmament.

Though Republicans, these citizens had with enthusiasm supported President Wilson in our entry into the war, which entry they had in fact strenuously and vehemently urged upon him. They had supported him in the prosecution of the war, differing from the Democrats only in outdoing them in urging its prosecution with greater energy. The war over, they were willing to support him in the peace and the League of Nations to enforce the peace and insure its permanency.

But in this they differed as to the terms upon which we would join the League. Many of them were willing and eager to follow President Wilson all the way. Many would follow him with reservations which were mild or merely interpretative.

At first less than a fourth of the party had even patience with the Lodge reservations. The three-fourths regarded them as too severe in tone and more drastic than was necessary, while only a negligible few would reject the League of Nations altogether.

But gradually very many of them came to see, or at least to believe that they saw, the actual threat of a super-state and of a dangerously entangling alliance involved in the Covenant without some such safeguards to American independence as the Senate reservations would provide.

It was only when by the November, 1919, com-

promise in the Senate, which the Democrats refused to enter, the Republican Senators reached agreement among themselves by which all the amendments and the worst reservations were defeated and the modified Lodge-McCumber reservations secured almost united Republican Senate support, that almost the entire pro-League Republican element in the party joined in the general Republican insistence that the League with those reservations was infinitely better than no League and called upon President Wilson and the Democratic Senators to close the deal on that basis and go in. If the reservations proved too drastic and hurtful to effective operation of the League's machinery, the American people would have it in their power to modify or withdraw them.

President Wilson's second and final refusal of that overture was given in March, 1920. Pro-League Republican support of the Treaty on any other basis than the Lodge reservations practically ended with that refusal.

Millions of pro-League Republicans who had been eager to sink partisan considerations and vote the Democratic ticket if necessary to gain assurance of continued world peace, saw in that breakdown of Democratic statesmanship the passing of the last hope of our entry into the League through the continuance of that leadership in power, and *distinctly as friends of the League of Nations*, they desired to entrust the government to other hands and another party.

There was something more than this. They believed, whether rightly or wrongly, that that arbitrary and deliberately chosen failure was made with the purpose of risking the entire vital question of the entry of our country into the League of Nations and the sacred and immeasurable interests of mankind involved in it, to the perils of a partisan political campaign in which the entire vital question might, through the injection of entirely irrelevant questions, be lost against the actual will of the people, and that it was for partisan advantage.

With that in their minds all thought of advancing the cause of world peace by a temporary abandonment of party lines was completely dissipated. They became eager for the banishment from power of Democratic leadership and desired to entrust the entire question to the constructive statesmanship of the Republican party under the leadership of a Republican President.

They also felt that with the handicap of the general unpopularity of Article X, the success of the Democratic ticket in the election was not a probability to be considered, and the hopes of League ratification lay with a winning and not a losing party.

Here may I remind the reader that I am not trying to express my personal views, though no doubt I am influenced by them since I am not other than human. I am writing history—the history of the development of pro-League Republican opinion. I am merely trying to call in review certain correlated facts and

point to the conclusions which they arbitrarily enforce.

Aside from the reasons given and the far more important ones to follow the one now to be stated, a sufficient explanation of the pro-League Republican vote for Senator Harding may be found in the well known fact that the most popular Republican leaders, who were also the men in the party of the greatest international fame, themselves ardent supporters of our entry into the League of Nations with reservations, urged support of the party ticket distinctly upon the ground that the best if not the only hope of our entry into the League was in the success of the party in the election and its consequent return to control in the national administration.

Conspicuous among these leaders were William Howard Taft, then the only living ex-President and the party standard bearer in the 1912 national election, and Charles Evans Hughes, the party standard bearer who in 1916 barely missed election to the presidency. Another was Elihu Root, eminent Republican leader and counsellor, regarded by many here and abroad the foremost American statesman. Added to these were all but one of the most popular candidates for the presidential nomination in competition with Senator Harding. These include Herbert Hoover, Leonard D. Wood, Frank O. Lowden and Nicholas Murray Butler, all of whom at that time favored our going into the League upon some basis of reservations, leaving Hiram Johnson the

one solitary but loudly protesting figure opposing.*

With these towering leaders urging the course in the interests of their own cause, is anything more needed to explain why pro-League Republicans voted for Harding?

But there are other and equally impressive reasons which, though they stood alone without the support of this important one, should fully satisfy.

Indeed, if all the foregoing reasons for the vote should fail to convince, there is another and absolutely reliable road by which we may arrive at a conclusive answer to the question suggested in the chapter title. It is by a way which though entirely different is not contradictory since it is only another and better defined highway to the same destination, by which we would reach it if the other roads did not exist.

By this road we will seek to arrive at a very definite answer to the question. We will hope to reach it by a way so well defined that it will be impossible for any reasonable and unbiased mind to lose the way or question the place of arrival when the conclusion is reached.

Beside the fact that they were Republicans and ordinarily voted the ticket from long-held and well-defined choice and habit and were so advised by their most trusted leaders, and were much dissatisfied

* NOTE: The names of Senator Borah and the few other irreconcilables who supported Senator Johnson's candidacy are omitted because they were not popular candidates for the nomination and would be lonesome beside the great list of eminent supporters of the other candidates.

with Democratic policy, what were the inducements to vote the Republican ticket that held the loyal support of millions of pro-League Republicans who for more than a year had urged that we enter the League either with the Lodge or milder reservations? For it must be remembered that in this election as in no other since the birth of the party, if we exclude the disastrous 1912 party split, the day of election was approached by the thoughtful with serious questioning and searching because of certain misinterpreted declarations by Senator Harding and other disquieting statements to which we will later give consideration.

The questioning took something like this form, "Can I on the League of Nations issue vote the Republican ticket?"

We will now consider the perfectly natural answer in the inducements which, entirely aside from the conclusive ones before stated, they found sufficient to overcome every objection. The road is a short one. It can be measured by minutes expressed in one figure.

In all national elections in this country there are three influences which are supposed to, more than any others, determine the voters' allegiance or dissent. They are the platform of the party, the party record and the personal popularity and public utterances of the candidate.

As to the platform—In five very able letters in a great newspaper, "A Pro-League Republican" very recently put up a good argument to show that a right

application of the Republican party platform expression upon the subject "must inevitably lead us into the League of Nations." For a man too busy to read the five articles there is a short-cut to the same conclusion, or to a strong emphasis to the conclusion, by a line of reasoning quite different from that presented in the five letters. This I beg the reader to take with me in a single paragraph as a preface to the few minutes which I will then ask him to devote to something far more important to the determination of the true meaning of the unprecedented Harding vote.

The Republican platform expression upon the question was a compromise in reluctant concession to the League of Nations' severest critics to avoid a threatened revolt in the Convention and a party split by a band of recognized and naturally much feared party wreckers who had twice defeated the party's success in a national election. It therefore did not reflect nearly so strongly as it would but for that exercise of necessary diplomacy, the actual sentiment of either the Resolutions Committee or the Convention, both of which favored a full and unqualified endorsement of the Republican Senate stand for the League with the Lodge reservations. But despite that handicap it was a distinct pledge to the people to join with the other nations of the world in *some* effective union for the prevention of war. More than that, the people, eagerly reading the newspapers, were well informed that the actual sentiment of Committee and Convention was not fully nor accurately

expressed in the platform, and generally voted for what they understood to be the actual sentiment. If the compromise platform declaration would lead us into the League of Nations, the real and well understood sentiment of Committee and Convention which a great majority of Republican voters accepted and approved as the Republican faith, would with much more certainty do so.

The short path we have now taken has brought us naturally to the much more significant and vastly more important proposition, to which I request the reader's thoughtful consideration.

The party platform no doubt had its influence upon the voters. But in that campaign, as always in national political campaigns, the record of the efforts and achievements of the party weighed in the voters' decision far more than mere platform expressions which are known to be primarily intended and carefully prepared for vote-catching and, in the progress of the campaign are soon forgotten. What was the party record on the question of world peace? It was this, that the Republican Senate leaders had twice made a distinct and definite proposal that we enter the League of Nations with the Lodge reservations and gave the proposal the tremendous emphasis of twice passing it by substantial majorities in the Senate. If that proposal had been accepted the United States would now be a member of the League of Nations with ample provisions for the preservation of peace.

The Democratic record was the rejection of that

compromise proposal and insistence upon what was known to be impossible of realization, since it could not command the vote to ratify, the retention in the Covenant of Article X practically without reservation. The Democratic Convention endorsed the record of that rejection. Those records of the two parties thus became, in the minds of the voters and in fact, the dominant issue of the campaign.

It must be conceded that the minds of the voters in general, in so far as they were influenced by the question, were thus made up upon the basis of the records of the two parties and therefore on the Republican side were in support of the Republican Senate contention and vote for our entry into the League of Nations with the Lodge reservations.

The last vestige of opposition to this conclusion must yield when it is considered that their adoption was *the one outstanding and toweringly conspicuous act of the party dwarfing into insignificance all others since the termination of the war, which act was discussed from one end of the land to the other as no question has been discussed since the Armistice, and as no one Senate act has been discussed since the American Constitution brought the Senate into being.* For months it gripped and held the attention of the entire country. If that is not the record of the party upon that question, what is?

To make it appear that the Republican vote was against that record and against the other influences named, all pointing the same way, and thus a repudiation of the League of Nations in its entirety, is

the great deception under which many excellent people have innocently fallen.

In so far as that issue influenced the voters and contributed to Senator Harding's landslide majority, we may rightly claim from him as a fair recognition of that vote, consideration for the League of Nations qualified by those reservations.

But since Senator Harding in his campaign speeches somewhat differently defined his position with respect to the League of Nations, we may consider our entry with those reservations not so distinct an issue and not an unqualified issue in respect to the question of peace, and look to his public utterances, though without doubt the party record was the determining factor with most voters. Into the consideration of Senator Harding's position we will enter more fully in another chapter. For the purpose of the completeness of this chapter it is enough to say that whenever he referred to a possible new association of nations, its inseparable companion in all his utterances, was revision of the existing League "if it has been so entwined and interwoven into the peace of Europe that its good must be preserved." And the full though not generally known text of his much maligned Des Moines speech shows that to be no exception. The sufficient proof of it is that Mr. Harding has publicly said so himself. Without doubt he would not hesitate to say it now.

The question would thus seem to be, has it been so entwined and interwoven?

If the answer is yes, then there would naturally

follow this other question—will the nations of Europe consent to revision or reservations that will offer such safeguards to American independence as will satisfy our people?

If the answer is no, then the campaign promises of President Harding and the pledge in the platform, to say nothing of the party record, must lead to some other effective union of nations for the preservation of world peace. Pro-League Republicans care little whether it be known as League or Association—or International Court “with teeth in it” as Senator Harding promised, if only it achieves the end for which it must be designed, world peace and international justice.

But pro-League Republicans would have this made very plain—If the platform and candidate were each half for new association and half for existing League, and the record of the party, more compelling in defining the voters’ position than both together, was not merely overwhelmingly but *all* for it, pro-League Republicans who voted the ticket cannot see how it can be made to appear that their vote was against the League.

They are not against the League nor are they against a new association. With that distinctly understood, there appears to be in their minds a readiness to follow President Harding in whom they have large confidence, either into the League or into a new association of nations that will give equal or better promise of world peace and better safeguards to American independence, if it have the sanction of

the statesmanship of the world and the support of two-thirds of the Senate—failing either of which it cannot be born.

But they would stubbornly refuse to go into a new association of nations upon the false and utterly untenable ground that it is a mandate from the people, to concede which they would consider a humiliating reflection upon their own intelligence.

What they distinctly did vote against was the Covenant of the League of Nations as “brought over from Paris” and “those obligations,” including Article X, of which Senator Harding said he sought not clarification but rejection and would never accept but would turn his back on. Since leading strongly pro-League Democrats in this country and likewise the nations of Europe are now disposed to the same rejection, it would seem that Mr. Harding’s views have to that extent already triumphed.

Pro-League Republicans in general feel safe with the President their millions of votes helped to elect with an unprecedented majority, in the confidence that he, the “sure-footed” man, as his Ohio neighbors describe him, would be the last to plunge his country into an undertaking to create a new association of nations without very carefully making sure, first, that it will have the assent of the best American minds and the fairly united support of the American people; second, that the nations of Europe will join us in it; third, that two-thirds of the Senate will ratify it, and, last and most important of all, that it will be effective to achieve the end for which

alone its creation can be justified, the preservation of peace.

Did he not through all his campaign take great pains to make and to emphasize with frequent reiteration all those promises? With what stubborn determination have some very good people insisted upon misunderstanding him! Read the full text of his utterances and see.

No one knows better than he and his able Secretary of State and Cabinet, that to attempt to realize a new association of nations (which must involve an abandonment of the League) and fail either to put his undertaking through or give to the world in what he brings into being an effective instrument for the preservation of peace, would be to his own everlasting humiliation in which our country must be deeply involved.

If for lack of the support of the nations of Europe or of the Senate, or for any reason, a new association of nations cannot be or is not born, pro-League Republicans rest in the confidence that the promises of President Harding, the platform of his party, and beyond all else the party record combine in a solemn pledge to the people of the only adequate immediate alternative, the entry of the United States into the League of Nations with the Lodge reservations, or such revision of them as the changed conditions may require and two-thirds of the Senate may approve.

But whatever may have been their contention at other times they do not now contend, in so far as I

have been able to learn what is in their minds,* that entry into the League with the Lodge or any other reservations is the only course now worthy of thought. There may be something better and they retain the open and inquiring mind. I have been merely calling in review the facts which indisputably show that that is what the people voted for in order that there be no misconception of the truth, and to keep it in line for adoption in the event it is found that nothing as good or better can be achieved.

Put in one short sentence, the vote of the average Republican was against the League as it then existed, but for it as the Republican reservations would make it, or its equivalent in an association of nations.

* NOTE: When expression is anywhere herein made of what the writer believes to be the views of pro-League Republicans, the reference is to them as a class and is not intended to include all its members, and particularly not those who upon conscientious grounds joined the "Independent Republican" movement in support of Governor Cox.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE: The author's qualifications to express their viewpoint were recently vouched for by several nationally known pro-League Republicans in a letter to President Harding in which he was requested to read "as a supplement to your conferences with eminent authorities upon international relations," an expression of views upon this subject from the author's pen. To this request they added, "There is probably no man who more than he accurately represents the point of view of the great majority of pro-League Republicans who cordially supported your election." This letter, which originated in the West, was signed by William Allen White of Kansas, Ray Lyman Wilbur, President of Leland Stanford University, Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury under McKinley and Roosevelt, M. L. Burton, President of Michigan University, Arnold B. Hall of the University of Wisconsin and Charles F. Thwing of Western Reserve University. A non-partisan endorsement of this letter was sent to the President with the signatures of Arthur Curtiss James, Major George Haven Putnam, Frank Crane, and the Rev. Drs. Cadman, Van De Water and Boynton of New York, Mrs. Philip North Moore of Missouri, Charles H. Richards of New Jersey, and Dr. F. E. Clark, Francis G. Peabody and Samuel Homer Woodbridge of Massachusetts.

What pro-League Republicans and the people in general in our own country and throughout the world would not tolerate and would not forgive, would be a falling back into doing nothing,—continued isolation which would mean destruction to our own financial, commercial and industrial prosperity, destruction to the world in which we must be inextricably involved and the end of hope for world peace. They would not tolerate a repetition of the deplorable failure of the last administration which, by rejection of the only possible basis of compromise, by which we might enter the League of Nations, achieved in the way of our participation as a nation with other nations in the preservation of peace—nothing at all.

That is what threw the tremendous pro-League vote to Harding.

They expect no repetition of that failure after that lesson.

In the confidence that their votes elected a man who is responsive to the people's will, they have no fears that he will in the final outcome disappoint reasonable expectation. In another chapter we will hear what he says.

CHAPTER III.

FACTS AND THE CONCLUSIONS THEY COMPEL.

IF some too hurried reader labors under the mistaken impression that the conclusion reached in the preceding chapter is based upon argument rather than upon facts, a brief partial résumé may convince him of his error.

The pro-League and average Republican faith that the success of the party in the election meant our entry into the League with reservations had for foundation the facts which here follow:

Fact One: The party platform, though a compromise in reluctant concession to the Johnson element to avoid a threatened party split, left the door equally open for our entry into a modified League or into a new association of nations and did in fact emphatically approve the act of Republican Senators in their vote to enter the League with the Lodge reservations, as will appear in quotations in another chapter, though as an act of discretion it refrained from a distinct mention of those reservations.

Fact Two: Every intelligent and interested voter who read the newspapers was informed that the actual sentiment of the Resolutions Committee and

of the Convention favored a strong and unequivocal endorsement of the Lodge reservations as the condition of our entry into the League of Nations, and only the unhappy memory of the fatal 1912 party defection and the fear of its repetition prevented the inclusion of that endorsement in the platform.

Fact Three: The greatest and most popular leaders in the party in loyal and earnest support of Senator Harding's election assured them that our entry into the League of Nations would be the result of Republican success. In another chapter this will be conclusively shown.

Fact Four: Senator Harding himself held out the promise of our entry into the existing League modified and revised, if the peace of Europe should require it.

Fact Five: The party record, always more influential in the determination of the vote than all the promises of Convention platform or campaign orators, was in respect to that question, distinctly, unqualifiedly and wholly for our entry into the League of Nations with strong qualifying reservations, and for nothing else whatever.

Fact Six: Not only their advisers, but the great majority of Republican voters from one end of the land to the other, had themselves for nearly two years insisted that we enter the League with the reservations supported by the Republican Senators.

Fact Seven: All the foregoing facts are exactly the kind of facts that influence and decide the voter's course in a national election.

All these indisputable facts combine to force the unbiased mind to accept as a logical and necessary inference that other fact that the great majority of the unparalleled vote that made Senator Harding President, was cast in obedience to the seven facts above recited, in favor of our entry into the existing League of Nations qualified by the Lodge reservations, or such revision of them as the changed world conditions may require and two-thirds of the Senate may approve.

Will any one in opposition (instead of mere declaration and dogmatic dictum which proves nothing but the writer's or speaker's zeal) publicly and accurately quote the paragraphs which set forth "facts" three, four, five and six, the most important of the seven, and undertake to refute them?

But there are some six million voters we have overlooked. The voters for the Democratic candidate were also American citizens. It is not disputed that they were almost all for the League with much less than the Lodge reservations. They, too, must be counted in arriving at the truth as to American opinion and the mandate of the American vote in the 1920 national election. We must therefore add six million votes to the Republican count for the League of Nations.

If the great majority of the total vote of both parties means the mandate of the American people for some effective and permanent union with other nations for the preservation of peace, by whatever name it may be called (and it can mean no less), it

is quite contrary to the present contention of the irreconcilables, who claim that they dominated the election, and is all we seek to establish or would ask of this administration.

All the foregoing facts unite to make to the reasoning mind an irrefutable demonstration of the truth that the great majority of the Republican voters cast their votes with the understanding that they were cast in favor of the League of Nations with Americanizing reservations.

But there is another line of facts pointing to the same conclusion which will appeal more strongly to the mind which delights to reason in the figures of arithmetic. If the preceding facts are conclusive that Republicans must inevitably have so voted, what we now propose to offer is unprejudiced testimony that they did so vote.

In this line of evidence may be considered the poll very recently taken by the National Economic League, the President of which happens to be a distinguished Republican. The poll was upon several questions three of which are particularly interesting in their relation to the question under discussion. The three questions and the result of the poll upon each here follow:

Question I. Should the United States refrain from joining any association of nations for the preservation of peace? Upon this question the poll was 84% in favor of joining to 16% against.

II. Should the United States enter the existing League of Nations with such modifications as were

approved by the United States Senate? The poll upon this question was 61% for to 39% against. It should here be had in mind that a large percentage of the 39% against may have been and probably were Democrats and Independent Republicans whose negative vote meant that they favor the League of Nations but reject the Lodge reservations, and whose votes if the truth were known would be counted more strongly for the League than those of the 61%.

III. Should the United States become a party to the Root-Phillimore Permanent Court of International Justice adopted by the Assembly of the League and now referred to member nations for ratification? In emphatic and impressive reply, the poll stood 93% for to 7% against.

Equally interesting and significant is the country-wide poll of women voters taken by *The Woman Citizen*, a weekly publication of New York City. The result of the poll made known in July, just in time for the last touch of revision of this book, indicates that an overwhelming majority of women voters, whether they cast their ballots for Senator Harding or for Governor Cox, believed that they were voting in the interests of the entry of the United States into the existing League of Nations.

The great interest taken in the canvass is strikingly shown by the fact that in response to the four issues in which the blank ballots have been printed up to the time of this writing, the replies have

equaled almost a third of the entire weekly circulation of the magazine.

The form of the questions are, "Did you vote the ticket [Republican or Democratic] believing the United States would join the League of Nations in some form?" and this, "Did you vote the ticket [Republican or Democratic] believing the United States would not join the League of Nations in any form?"

In every State, with the exception of Indiana and Utah, the result of the poll was more than 90% in expression of belief that the result would be entry into the League. The average poll in all States without separation upon party lines, was 92.5% for to 7.5% against.

In Massachusetts and New York the percentage for the League was 94, in Connecticut, 93. The total returns from Utah and Indiana (in which States was the lowest percentage of vote for the League) were so small that they had scarcely any effect on the total result since the highest percentage for the League given by any State (94%) appears to be only $1\frac{1}{2}\%$ larger than the average percentage in the total from all the States, Utah and Indiana included. This remarkable uniformity in the average is very significant. Nothing could better show the substantial accuracy of the poll as a gauge of the actual sentiment.

The *Woman Citizen's* poll of the Republican voters throughout the country when separated from the other vote, shows that nearly four-fifths of them

had cast their ballots for Senator Harding in the belief that they were voting for the entry of the United States into the League of Nations.

It may be said that this was a poll taken by a publication which was favorable to the League. Be it so, it shows that about four-fifths of its Republican readers voted for Harding in the belief that in so doing they voted for our entry into the League of Nations. In so far as that is an indication that the Republicans in general (nearly all of whom were in favor of entering the League when the election campaign began) continued their allegiance to the party and voted for its candidate in the belief that his election would mean our entry into the League, it is a complete vindication of the interpretation put upon all the facts which this volume has marshaled in review. For our claim from title page to conclusion is this and only this, that the great majority of the Republican voters, once for the League of Nations in some form, were still for it in some form on election day and voted in expectation that the success of their party would result in our entry into the League of Nations with reservations.

If that view of the vote is sustained and proved to be the true one, then to make it appear that Senator Harding's seven million majority was against the League of Nations is indeed The Great Deception which we assert it to be.

This last line of facts is not only interesting but very impressive and must be admitted to be a strong reenforcement of all the other evidences which have

been offered. But the impregnable line of facts preceding them in this review is far more conclusive. This is limited, the other is comprehensive and embraces the land from one end to the other. A skeptic may say of this that it may be exceptional, or that it is representative of a few or of a class and therefore it is not conclusive. But it cannot be disputed that the other is general and representative of the entire party, not as individuals but as a party.

The great Republican leaders who advised the voters that Senator Harding's election would insure our entry into the League, were as representative of the party as the most popular leadership could make them. By recent choice of the people one of them is now the Vice President of the nation and another the Governor of the greatest State in the union. By President Harding's appointment one is now the Secretary of State, another an influential member of the Cabinet. Another has declined a cabinet appointment. By the same designation three are abroad in important administration service and another the Chief Justice of the United States. Another, still at the top in the highest rank of elder statesmanship in the party, excelled in international repute by no citizen of our Republic, has been singled out from the few foremost Americans and called by representatives of the highest world authorities to distinguished and exceptional international responsibility and service. Of the two whose voices were silent as to public expression because of restrictions imposed by official position but whose

views favoring entry into the League with reservations were widely known and influential, one is now the General of the Armies, the other the first and most popular Admiral of the Navy.

The platform was not the platform of a faction but of the whole party in promise of union with the other nations in an "international association" through which "the nations pledged to do and *insist upon* what is just and fair may exercise their influence *and power* for the prevention of war." The voice of the candidate was not the voice of a faction or sectional leader but of the party's chief in solemn pledge of our entry either into the League or into an association of nations that will insure peace to mankind.

The record was that of the whole party and upon the question of our joining the League with reservations was yes and only yes, without essential change from the time the Treaty was fairly before the Senate until Congress adjourned to prepare for the national election. The party itself, not here and there a faction or a clique, but the party as a party (and what is a party but the great phalanx of its voters?) stood for many months preceding the election, as did its Congress, for the League with reservations.

Factions, coteries and cliques in the Senate and elsewhere may have faced the other way and loudly proclaimed their rebellion, but the party stood firm.

These are facts—undeniable facts. Here again we might challenge any skeptic to refute the statement that they are facts. From these facts which

cannot be impeached, the only sane conclusion is that the millions of men and women who faced that way for two years before the election must have faced the same way when they cast an American ballot on election day, unless there are conclusive proofs to show a complete reversal in the short period between the time when they were known to face that way and the day they elected Harding.

There are no proofs of any such reversal.

Because, in the face of all those facts and in vain and unreasoning denial of all that compelling influence, a few very conspicuous platform headliners, braced by a storm of German-Irish anti-League applause, declared that the election of Harding meant the scrapping of the League, and now declare that the entire idea of any association of nations is likewise scrapped, is no reason why any sane and unprejudiced mind should believe them or despair of our early and effective union with other nations for the preservation of peace and the assurance of international justice.

But while this first line of facts is supreme in importance and impregnable in convincing power, the second line of facts is only in the formation stage. The reenforcements are being reenforced. Like facts are occurring every day and in accumulated power as time goes on they are yet to become as convincing as the other. That they are cumulative and will continue to be cumulative in larger and yet larger volume will be more and more evidenced until the decision is reached in action by the President

and the Senate. All over the country it is a rising voice, growing and to continue growing in greater volume and stronger and more convincing tones. It is the duty and should be the pleasure of every public spirited citizen to make his voice heard, for or against, in accord with his own honest conviction.

Pulpits, platforms, universities, student bodies, societies of workmen, chambers of commerce and great business, industrial, financial, educational, religious and other bodies and assemblies throughout the land will speak again as they once spoke before, and this time their voice will be listened to and obeyed.

What that united voice will demand and what that demand will receive in answer will be adoption of the peace plan finally proposed by this administration—if it satisfies the wisdom, the conscience and the heart of the American people. That it may do that, it must secure the assent of the statesmanship of Europe and respond to the long deferred and often disappointed hopes of mankind. Will it be the League, modified and revised, or a new association of nations? Time and, it is to be hoped, the combined wisdom of American and European statesmanship, backed by the united support of American and world sentiment will decide.

If I may here address a paragraph or two to President Harding, I would say with very genuine respect,—If influenced, as any man in like situation naturally would be, by your own strong opposition to the League and desire to father and bring into being some other society of nations to supplant it,

you have accepted the hearty applause which greeted your severe criticism and rejection of the superstate features of the Covenant and the great vote by which you were elected, as conclusive evidence that the will of the American people is total rejection of the League, would it not be the part of wisdom to entirely review the question, giving with the judicial and open mind which you fortunately possess, very full consideration to the facts herein presented, and the influence they must have exerted in contribution to the phenomenal vote you received?

Is it a safe conclusion to assume that in rejection of the advice of their most popular leaders that your election meant the fairest opportunity for our entry into that League upon some fair basis of compromise, your own oft repeated promise that the good in it should have fair consideration and all the other influences we have cited, they reversed their well known attitude and voted a mandate to scrap the League?

Let us consider this question with open minds to the end.

CHAPTER IV.

THE PROMISES AND WARNINGS OF HARDING AND THE PLATFORM.

Light on the Des Moines Speech.

WE have seen that the platform of the Republican party, its framers politically black-jacked in the Committee room into submission to a demand not to commit the Convention to a specific declaration in favor of the Lodge reservations, left the way equally open for the formation of a new association or entry into the existing League of Nations with safeguarding reservations. But it did more than that. It distinctly pledged the administration, which the party's success in the election would put into the place of power, to bring about, not in selfish and futile isolation, but in union with other nations, whether its name be association or league, some erection of power which should be effective for the preservation of peace and the conservation of the great interests of civilization and mankind.

Is not that all that the friends of world peace should demand?

If the pledges of the party platform are kept (astraddle to save the party harmony though the

platform was), there will be no failure to legislate and make full and effective use of American diplomacy for the stabilization of a fast disintegrating world and the prevention of war.

To quote the actual words of the platform, it pledged "agreement among the nations to preserve the peace of the world" and "such agreements with the other nations of the world as shall meet the full duty of America to civilization and humanity." And that promised agreement among the nations it termed an "international association" through which "the nations pledged to do and *insist upon* what is just and fair may exercise their influence *and power* for the prevention of war."

The italics in the foregoing quotations are mine with intent to fix attention to words that have a definite and important meaning in the connection in which they occur—to "*insist upon*" and to exert not merely influence but also "*power* for the prevention of war."

Senator Harding, whether he spoke of existing League, new association of nations or international court, pledged as much.

That is all that pro-League Republicans ask. They will be content with no less.

Incidentally, though the Lodge reservations were, for the sake of preventing Senators Johnson and Borah from executing a threat to wreck the Convention harmony and perhaps bolt the ticket, not endorsed by name in the platform, the platform recites that the Republican Senators "performed their

duty faithfully," and adds, "We approve their conduct and honor their courage and fidelity." The duty they had performed was nothing else than support of our entry into the League of Nations with the Lodge reservations.

It was shown in the preceding chapter, I think quite conclusively, that the record of the party more compelling in the voters' decision than expressions of platform and candidate combined, was wholly and unqualifiedly for the League of Nations with reservations safeguarding American independence which were twice passed by the Republican majority in the Senate.

But, as was said in that chapter, since Senator Harding in his campaign speeches somewhat differently defined his position with respect to the League of Nations, we may consider our entry with those reservations not so distinct an issue and not an unqualified issue in respect to the question of peace, and look to his public utterances, though without doubt the party record was the determining factor with most voters.

Turning to the personal pledges of the candidate and giving due weight to his warnings as well as to his pledges, we may rightly claim and confidently expect from President Harding the fulfilment of the promises made in his public utterances in asking for the suffrages of his fellow-citizens. What were they? And in what way were they qualified?

First let us throw some light on the Des Moines speech. In the few days which the writer spent in

Ohio in the hottest part of the political campaign, taking particular pains to inquire he learned from some of Senator Harding's intimate friends and political supporters, men who were with him wherever he spoke in the campaign, including Des Moines, that the newspaper reports of that speech were grossly misleading, in that the important and qualifying context was entirely omitted.

When he said in that speech that what he desired was not interpretation or clarification, but rejection—that he wanted to turn his back on those obligations; he also said (which was the part not reported), the same that he said in his important declaration of August 28th, and in other addresses, this: “If the League which has hitherto rivetted our considerations and apprehensions, has been so entwined and interwoven into the peace of Europe, that its good must be preserved in order to stabilize the peace of that continent, then it can be amended or revised.”

Moreover, Senator Harding himself publicly said that the speech was misrepresented and the reports of it misleading in the way above stated. But, as is usual in such cases, the correction was not able to outrun the half-truth which in effect was a whole lie, which got the start at Des Moines.

The newspaper correspondents, with the trained instinct for news, could see in his Des Moines speech only the striking and new. In fact, what he said on the other side he had made so plain and had empha-

sized so often, they probably saw no need to report it anew.

Whatever may be the position of the President now, Senator Harding never said in the public utterances of the campaign, not even in the garbled reports of his speech at Des Moines, that he would reject and turn his back on the League of Nations. What he said was that he wished to reject and turn his back on "*those obligations.*" What were those obligations? He named them in that very speech, when he said that he would never accept the obligations of Article X. He said that he would never accept the League of Nations "*brought from Paris by President Wilson.*" But he also said in that same speech that, if necessary, he would accept the good in the League of Nations with the bad cast out.

The League of Nations "*brought from Paris by President Wilson,*" and rejected by the Senate, was a very different thing from the League of Nations as qualified by the Lodge reservations and approved by a great majority of Republican Senate votes.

But there were serious warnings as well as promises in the campaign utterances of President Harding. Some of the warnings may be found in the foregoing quotations. Perhaps the most serious of his warnings, the severest and at the same time the most just criticism or condemnation of the existing League of Nations is found in his most important pre-election address, that of August 28th, when he said:

“We know that the League constituted at Versailles is utterly impotent as a preventative of wars. It is so obviously impotent that it has not even been tried. It could not survive a single test. The original League, mistakenly conceived and unreasonably insisted upon, has undoubtedly passed beyond the possibility of restoration. The maturer judgment of the world will be that it deserved to pass for the very simple reason that contrary to all of the tendencies developed by the civilizing processes of the world, it rested upon the power of might, not right.”

But in the same address in which he made that indictment of the League, the justice of the concluding line of which I do not deny, he also gave expression to the words quoted in a preceding paragraph in this chapter, referring to the possible necessity of stabilizing the peace of Europe by preserving the good in the League, and added, “then it can be amended or revised so that we may still have a remnant of world aspirations in 1919 builded into the world’s highest conception of helpful cooperation in the ultimate realization.”

If I make frequent reference to that expression I follow a distinguished precedent, for Senator Harding gave it unusual emphasis by doing the same thing with that same paragraph.

It must not be overlooked that conspicuous among his warnings, in allusion to the Senate vote to ratify the Treaty with the Lodge reservations, he said:

“It was with that feeling of sympathy and desire to serve, that most reluctantly and with grave misgivings, as I announced at the time, I voted to accept the League covenant with reservations designed to preserve our essential liberty of action. The record is made, and under the same conditions, confronted by the same alternative, I should vote now as I voted then. But the conditions have changed. Experience has brought enlightenment.”

That is one of the most unfavorable of his expressions in respect to our entry into the League of Nations. But it should not be taken alone, for a few minutes later in the same address he gave utterance to the oft-repeated expression of the possibility, which seemed always to be in his mind, of the peace of Europe being so involved in the League of Nations that its good must be preserved.

It is true that the conditions have changed. But if in the changed conditions the peace of Europe is found to be still so involved in it that the two cannot be separated, we know what to expect from President Harding.

Whether it is or not, that is exactly what nearly every strong advocate of the League of Nations believed to be true at that time, and they believed and still believe that when Senator Harding, as the President, looks into the conditions in Europe he will find the peace of that continent so inextricably involved in it, that he will see to it that under whatever plan for world peace these United States will join with the nations of Europe, the good that is

in the existing League of Nations will be preserved.

It was because of that belief as to the actual and easily discovered facts and their belief in the sincerity of that utterance by Senator Harding, that they gave him and are now giving him their cordial support. If it is found to be not so involved, they are quite ready to give their support to any other plan that will be a sufficient guarantee of that peace.

They find encouragement in the following declaration made by the President in his address to Congress on April 12th which seems to them consistent with all his promises:—"The American aspiration, indeed, the world aspiration, was an association of nations, based upon the application of justice and right, binding us in conference and cooperation for the prevention of war and pointing the way to a higher civilization and international fraternity in which all the world might share."

CHAPTER V.

OTHER PROMISES AND WARNINGS.

AMONG the most unkind of Senator Harding's references to the League, and what are regarded by many as the least felicitous of his expressions, were his characterizations of it as "deceased" and "defunct." A thing that is deceased can have value only as a carcass and not as a living, vital asset. But the fact that it does mean just that is what makes it so inconsistent with his other and frequent references to it as a thing that may be "modified," or "revised," or that we may "join on our own terms," that we must conclude that when he so characterized it he had in mind the League "brought over from Paris" and encumbered by "those obligations," and not the thing that might be so "modified" or "revised" that we might accept it or "join on our own terms," for upon no conceivable terms would we join ourselves to a corpse.

His public utterances taken as a whole, though qualifying, were not contradictory to the party record. Though they totally rejected the League as "brought from Paris by President Wilson" or with "those obligations" which he clearly indicated to be the obligations contained in Article X, it is significant that in all his public utterances, even in the

much criticized Des Moines speech, when taken in its full text, he held out the hope of our entering the League of Nations as possible, along with that other possibility, a new association of nations.

In addition to all that we have seen, consider also this among his declarations:

“I have said repeatedly, and I say again, that when elected I will immediately summon the best minds in America, representing an all-American opinion to consult and advise as to America’s relationship to the present association of nations, to modifications of it or substitutes for it.” Here he puts “the present association of nations” and the suggested substitute for it on equal terms and, if there is any significance in precedence in the order of the mention, the suggestion of modification precedes that of substitution.

But whatever of encouragement he might give to the friends of the League of Nations, his political foes and many of the Republican friends of the League who had joined the “Independent Republican” movement in support of Governor Cox, could give weight to nothing but his denunciation of the League and continued to quote the garbled excerpts of his Des Moines speech and the biased expressions of the irreconcilables who assumed to speak for him, as the authoritative and final definition of his position.

Aware of this misinterpretation and annoyed by its unfairness and with evident intent to correct it, he more than once took pains to say publicly that

he had said nothing and would say nothing to conflict with that passage in his important speech of August 28th, in which he had suggested our possible entry into a revised or modified League.

Not only did he correct the Des Moines misrepresentation, but he gave emphasis to the correction and anticipated future half truths that might be put forth in statements which would have the full effect of whole lies in their influence on the public mind, when on October 11th he sent in answer to a telegram from the editor of an important publication in New York in reference to that speech, this telegraphic reply, "There has been and will be no change from the position of August 28th."

The writer will not soon forget the deep impression of earnestness and sincerity which Senator Harding made upon his mind when in one of the last days of his campaign in Ohio he heard him introduce in an impressive address a correction of persistent misrepresentation with words calculated to drive it in so it would stay in the memory, "I have said repeatedly and I say again,"—and then he went on to say over again one of the important declarations which we have quoted in preceding pages.

In one of his addresses he quoted Viscount Grey as saying, "The Americans must be told that if they will only join the League they can practically name their own terms," and added, "I ask is there any good reason why we should not avail ourselves of this privilege?" What can "privilege" mean if not the enjoyment of its benefits?

Mr. Wickersham came from his conference with him strong in the belief that he would seek Treaty revision. It is significant that Mr. Wickersham's statement was issued from the Harding Campaign Bureau.

In his letter to Dr. Schurman Senator Harding made a great advance when he said, "I recognize that the world's peace is now to a great extent intertwined with the settlement of Versailles. From that settlement I would save all that is good and useful." But he made it plain that this did not necessarily involve our entering the League when he immediately added, "An association of nations for purposes of conference, and a world court with jurisdiction of justiciable questions would, I am confident, now be accepted by all nations."

He continues: "This plan we have been repeatedly assured by European statesmen would meet their approval. Mr. Lloyd George has frankly expressed opinion that the League of Nations covenant might well be changed for the better. Certainly it is our thought to improve, to save and build upon whatever is good rather than to abandon the good there is and repudiate the world's aspirations for peace."

On the first Friday after the election the writer had the good fortune to have, by appointment, a brief half hour with President-Elect Harding in what was probably the first interview (I hardly dare say conference) had with him upon the international situation following the people's verdict. Two very

brief sentences which he uttered in that conversation impressed me deeply, but, restrained by the thought that they might not have been intended for other ears, I long refrained from making them public. Recently, reading for the second time his public addresses, I discovered that they only express in a little better form what he had said to all the reading public, and I am constrained to feel that I violate no confidence in printing them. They seem to me, in some respects, the most significant of his utterances.

Immediately on leaving his office in the Marion "Administration House" I jotted down his precise words, lest a not always reliable memory for exact expression might not perfectly retain them. They were these, "It has been said that the nations of Europe will not consent to revision. I have assurances that they will." The word "*revision*" could refer to nothing other than the existing League of Nations, for how could he revise an association of nations which does not exist? To casual reading this may not seem more than that he had under consideration at that time revision of the League as one of the possibilities. But viewed in connection with his other utterances it must mean at least this, that (provided it does not take first place in his plans at the outset) if substitution fails or for any reason is abandoned, then this, a revised League of Nations, the companion in all his propositions of the suggested substitute (an association of nations), shall have the largest place in his plans—unless he shall decide to give the party record equal weight with his cam-

paign utterances and adopt the League with the Lodge reservations.

It would be a manifest breach of propriety to repeat here all that he said in the privacy of that interview, but I may with propriety and in truth say that the impressions made upon my mind were all confirmatory of the promises herein quoted and of the conclusions which I have deduced from them. Not once did he mention a new association of nations.

If one would really know another, there is nothing, short of frequent association and intercourse, that so well reveals what manner of man he is as to sit down with him in earnest exchange of serious thought. If I were in the least affected by the idea, which found lodgment in some minds, that the Senator had so evenly balanced warning with promise in his campaign discussions of our international relations merely for the purpose of winning votes from both sides at the sacrifice of honest frankness, the thought could have no lodgment after that interview.

If he used diplomacy, as well he might, it was of the open variety, a diplomacy of fairness to both sides, not of fairness to a divided political party merely but to the truth itself, and which had as its chief motive and aim the highest good of his country and mankind. His holding the extreme opposing elements in the party to him was not half so much to win the election, of which he felt absolutely certain, as it was to be able to achieve something worth while for the permanent peace of the world after the

election should have put upon his broad shoulders the great responsibility.

I can never forget the convincing expression in his eyes, his voice and his gesture when he said in our conference, "Few have realized the great importance and the difficulties of the task which confronted me in the campaign. I found two great opposing elements in the party, and it was my supreme task to bring them together. It was vitally necessary to do that if as President I am to render any great service to the cause of peace, to which I am deeply devoted."

And then he said it all in one great and confirming gesture, when the strong and ample arms which he had extended to right and left, were brought with the open palms not too near together in one forceful sweep in which reserved space I seemed to see the ample form of William Howard Taft and that of Hiram Johnson and their followers lifted and put down together in a common group for a great united effort behind the incoming administration as he added, "That was my task. I had to reach out to both of these groups and unite them—and I have done it."

When I told him what I saw in that gesture there was a responsive smile in his eyes, which, together with the whole expression of the face seemed to say, "You understand me," and then the expression instantly changed to one of serious determination as if to add, "Am I not right?"

He is a greathearted, a serious and earnest nor-

mal man, who I have faith to believe will not lay down his task until he shall have achieved a great thing for mankind. No man ever had a greater opportunity.

Relying upon the promises which I have quoted and many more like them, many millions of the friends of world organization for peace gave earnest support to Senator Harding's candidacy. President Harding knows it and will show a proper respect for their sincere and reasonable opinions, expectation and desires.

Mr. Harding knows as well as any one else that it will reflect no credit upon him to effect the entry of the United States into any world organization for the preservation of peace that will fail of the purpose for which it is brought into being. His own peace and satisfaction of mind, his contribution to the well-being of his people, the greatness of his country as a world leader and the welfare of the human race, as well as the determination of his own place in history, all depend upon his success in leading the United States of America into a league or association of nations that will not be a failure but a glorious success in the realization of the highest and dearest hope of all the civilized peoples of the earth, that the insufferable burden of the maintenance of great armies and navies shall be lifted from the backs of men and that there shall come in the day when the fear of the involvement of the world in the conflagration of war shall no longer hang as a

threatening cloud over the lives of men and women, for it will be made a thing impossible.

His task will be no easy one. The compromise twice offered in the Senate and twice refused may never be possible again. An irreconcilable element in both parties will do everything in their power to defeat his fair proposals. In such a situation will not the friends of peace rally to his side and help him to worthy achievement? Though it be a new association of nations which will receive the sanction of the statesmanship of the world, or a revision of the existing League of Nations, it would seem their natural and reasonable course to do their part to make it worth while.

Or it may be, since to some of our ablest international statesmen it seems improbable that the forty and more nations now constituting the League of Nations will ever consent to abandon the structure which they have builded, and, though the necessities of Europe which may equally become our necessity may urgently invite our entry it may easily be impossible to secure the required consent of their governments to revise, that there will be a coming back to the old proposal of entering with reservations. Then, if all other proposals of reservations fail of the required two-thirds vote in the Senate, there will have been prepared by the proposal of the fifty Republicans and Democrats in the question to both Harding and Cox and their public answers during the campaign (which will be recited in an addenda), as well as by the party record,—the old meeting

ground of compromise, the old Senate reservations, already discussed for more than a year, twice passed by a majority vote of the Senate and leaving in the Covenant the economic boycott against war, the code of laws, the court, arbitration, disarmament—after all, the better things.

A prejudiced reader will deceive himself if he insists, as he easily may, that the writer's purpose has been to produce an argument in behalf of our entry into the League. Though the argument of the facts which I am trying faithfully to call into review without keeping any essential part in the background, in which the record of the party by its own inherent right is supreme, does much favor our entry into the League (which I could not conceal or deny without manifest unfairness), I here repeat what was said in an earlier chapter, first, that it may be the President's highest obligation to disregard the mandate of the vote in response to more imperative demands which the facts of new world conditions may impose; second, that, as to myself I am quite disposed in favor of something different from the League to supersede it, as will be more fully expressed in the final chapter.

But, for the sake of truth and for the safety of the world, I would leave open a fair and honest chance for the League if nothing better is obtained, and I will add for our temporary membership in the League if the better and ultimate must wait because the immediate necessities of the enforcement of the

terms of the peace and the stabilization of civilization demand it.

But frankly, in the exercise of the open diplomacy which I believe in and practise, the purpose of this writing is more than anything else to put into the slumber of innocuous desuetude, the selfish and woefully shortsighted activities and influence of the unreasoning and timid un-American Americans who, afraid to trust Brother Jonathan to play with the other big international schoolboys in the great game of world affairs and civilization's rescue, would bar our country from taking her natural and rightful place of leadership at the forefront of the movement for a safe insurance of world peace, in any form whatever, at the hour of supreme opportunity which has now struck.

The world's call for help is to America as much as it was at the time we decided to send our boys to Château Thierry and the Argonne. The nations of Europe will consent to some new form of international cooperation if it will save a tottering civilization, but expect us to enter the League "if it has been so entwined and interwoven" in their peace "that its good must be preserved."

As to President Harding, I believe it to be beyond question, and may be deduced from his public expressions, that he would much prefer an "association of nations for conference," using the Hague Tribunal to settle justiciable disputes between nations, rather than that we enter the League of Na-

tions upon any basis. I think he has made that quite plain.

But there is that "*If*"! Like Banquo's ghost it will not down. But unlike Banquo's ghost it is not terrifying or entirely unwelcome. It is an honest question in his mind. In due time, with the deliberate sureness which is one of his chief and best characteristics, he will answer it, and the answer will be satisfying to his own conscience, to his countrymen and to reasonable and just men the world over.

CHAPTER VI.

HOW MISCONCEPTION BEGAN AND GREW.

THE misconception was caused partly by the indefiniteness of the party platform which, due, as we have seen, to a compromise to quiet a threatening bolt by the "bitter-enders," endorsed the action of the Republican Senators in voting to ratify the Treaty with the Lodge reservations but avoided a specific approval of those reservations.

But much more than this, it was due to the necessities of a frontal attack upon the League Covenant as "brought over by Wilson." The Democratic platform and candidate had made the issue one of "going in" upon the Wilson basis. The Republicans were therefore compelled to make their issue one of staying out.

Senator Harding more than once made the distinction between the League with "those obligations" into which we would not enter, and the League revised which under certain conditions we might enter. But he had to devote most of his energies to attack.

The foremost leaders in the Republican party, Mr. Root, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Taft and Mr. Hoover conspicuous among them, made the distinction very plain, and made it clear, as Mr. Harding did not,

that the American inclination and the recognized policy of the party was to join the League with safeguarding reservations. But in general campaign orators and audiences are not given to distinctions fine or otherwise. When they attack they attack.

The great offensive against the enemy's lines was under full way. The enemy had entrenched themselves in the League of Nations' citadel. They had adopted it as their main and as they believed their impregnable fortress. It was necessary to take it by storm. Little ammunition and little energy could the Republican campaigners afford to waste on explanations and distinctions. It was political policy to hit the League hard, and with all their energy they hit it. Even the distinguished statesmen we have named as strongly favoring our entry into the League with reservations, in their campaign speeches and writings strongly attacked it, sometimes without qualification though qualification was always present in their minds.

But on the other hand, those Republican members of the Senate group who were bitterly opposed not only to our entry into the League upon any basis but also to any participation with the nations of Europe in organized cooperation to establish a reign of peace, which cooperation they looked upon as "entangling alliances," were not backward nor were their supporters not of the Senate backward, in doing their utmost to make it appear upon all possible occasions, that the Republican policy and purpose was to reject the League in all its features and

impose isolation as the national policy in international affairs.

That policy of positive assertion as against that which was adopted by many pro-League Republicans to attack only its more objectionable features with occasional distinctions and qualifications, gave to those who were not well informed as to the real attitude of Republicans in general, a very natural inclination to believe that the Republican party program was nothing else than total rejection of the League, while those who wished it to be such invariably accepted it as the prevailing Republican position.

Then, along with Senator Harding's strong denunciation of the League as "brought over from Paris," came his proposal of an association of nations. This though, as we have seen, its invariable companion in all his utterances was League modification or revision if the necessities of Europe required it, gave strong encouragement to that view. From that time the association idea was, by those who preferred that the public so understand it, held to be the accepted Republican policy. Some desired that it be so understood because as Republicans they favored it as a policy, others because, being in political opposition to Harding, they wished to put it upon him and his party as a handicap in the political race.

As it was a new idea the newspapers made the most of it as news. Whatever Senator Harding said upon international relations, unless it was plainly

contrary to that idea, the newspaper correspondents and particularly the newspaper headliners proclaimed it as more advocacy of his association of nations, though it may have had no relation to it.

This was natural for Senator Harding made it plain enough that the association idea was first in his preferences, but always with the "if" to which we have repeatedly referred. But the newspaper reports and headlines invariably stressed his advocacy of a new association while they put as little emphasis as possible upon the accompanying and qualifying if, or completely ignored it.

The necessary stress of opposition to the super-state and entangling alliance features of the League Covenant, not only by the Republican candidate but by all the party speakers including those who expected and desired our ultimate entry into the League with qualifying reservations, added to the opportunity for misconception of the real attitude of the party as a whole.

Then followed the Des Moines speech and the complete misrepresentation of it by the omission in the published reports of the important and qualifying context which, if reported, would have distinctly and strongly qualified and limited its apparent total rejection of the League.

The omission to report the context was probably not with any intention to misrepresent or conceal. It is the trained instinct of the newspaper reporter and correspondent to serve the curiosity of a sensation-loving public by setting before it the startling,

the inharmonious and the new. That is "news," while the regular and normal is passed by as uninteresting if not monotonous if for no other reason because it is the usual and normal. That is equally true of the newspaper headliner, who is many times more frequently and more attentively read than the correspondent or the editor, and whose opportunity and temptation to put his own coloring into the news is far greater.

These were ably supported by certain well known platform "headliners" who drew the more attention because they were inharmonious and out of the normal in their views. Thus the very fact that they were out of harmony with the party record and the well known sentiment of the Convention and with the accepted party view, gave them prominence. They had a strong if not a controlling political motive in the strenuous efforts they put forth to make the candidate of the party appear to support their extreme position.

In this effort they represented the attitude of Senator Harding to be much more opposed to the League than his public utterances would warrant. They assumed to speak for him and were not rebuked for the apparent reason that to precipitate a quarrel with them at a critical period in the campaign might cause a party schism, such as under their partial leadership in other national elections bore the party down to defeat.

Paraphrasing Senator Harding's sayings in a way to make them appear in greater opposition to the

League than what he actually said would support, they coined denunciatory expressions which during the campaign and after were widely received as the authentic expressions of the Republican candidate. They apparently believed and made many others believe that they dominated the Republican campaign and its issues. To their influence is due a large part of the misconception of the meaning of the great Harding vote.

All over the country such reliable Republican voices as those of Taft, Root, Hughes, Hoover, Lowell, Butler, Wickersham and Schurman and in his quiet but effective way, that of the late W. Murray Crane, were heard giving assurance that Republican success gave the best promise of our entering the League upon some basis that would satisfy American sentiment and give the best guarantees of world peace, but the opposing and discordant voices caught the attention of the publicity purveyors because the sensation of the discordance gave to the reports of their sayings, which were the extreme of opposition to the known party record, the most ready market at the newsstands.

The great majority of thinking Republicans who favored our entry into the League with reservations and had made up their minds, distinctly as friends and supporters of the League thus qualified and Americanized, to support and vote the Republican ticket, were not dissuaded from their purpose by any or all of these manifestations, nor were they deceived by the misrepresentations.

They well understood that the platform of the party distinctly endorsed the Senate vote to enter the League with the Lodge reservations, though in deference to the irreconcilable opposition and more in fear of it, it compromised by omitting to mention them by name.

They knew that even if the cordial endorsement of that act of the Republican members of the Senate had been left out, the platform would still have left the door equally open for an association of nations or entry into the League. They knew that Senator Harding, though showing a preference for a new association also left that door widely open.

But more than all they had put their faith in the record of the party, the real, the most authoritative and most generally accepted expression of the party sentiment, which was nothing else than entry into the existing League with the Senate reservations; thus making the total of Republican promise easily three for to one against the League.

But they who were, very naturally, prejudiced, either because they were the determined foes of the League upon any basis and welcomed such distinguished support, or because as members of the opposing party or being of those who distrusting Republican leadership on the League issue had allied themselves with it, were disposed to believe the worst of any Harding expression which might be construed as against the League, and from their respective viewpoints make the most of it.

What he said in its favor they seemed not to

have read or to regard merely as bait thrown out to catch the unwary voter.

The many who on account of absorbed interest in other affairs read the reports hurriedly or only in newspaper headlines, fell easy victims to the worst interpretation.

Most of the members of the three or four classes mentioned are very honest in their misinterpretation. Therefore the greater need to expose and correct it. The Independent Republicans who supported the Democratic candidate on the League of Nations issue, though among the best, the ablest and fairest men, were themselves victims of that misinterpretation and helped, and many of them are still helping (very much against the interests of their cause) to give it respectable authority.

But all these influences combined would have made comparatively little headway if it were not for a remarkable and very unusual aid. I refer to the exceptional opportunity which the election afforded for propaganda in favor of two causes which were very dear to the hearts of some millions of our people who are of foreign birth or descent; the causes of the German and of the Irish people.

To this propaganda was devoted a few paragraphs in the first chapter, but only for purposes of definition to separate the Harding voters who were distinctly Republican from those whose support was not in its purpose Republican but racial and in the interests of other peoples. But that chapter was not the place in which to use it to show how mis-

interpretation began and grew to large proportions.

The opportunity for the success of that propaganda was greatly aided by the fact that, as we have seen, certain features of the League Covenant were equally opposed by a great majority of those Republicans who were much in favor of accepting it with reservations that would correct those objectionable features and make it conform to American ideals and allay American apprehensions. Thus the friends and advocates of the League with reservations were compelled to unite with its worst foes in attacks upon it until those objectionable features could be excised.

It is true that, whether rightly or wrongly or grossly exaggerated as some say, the idea of super-government contained principally in Article X of the Covenant of the League of Nations, became the most hated thing in the minds of a very large body of the American people and particularly of the Republican party, though the great majority of them were devoted to the general principles and objects of the League. Embodied in the compact as brought over from Paris by President Wilson and declared by him to be the heart of the Covenant, it brought out the strongest expression of disapproval whenever the League of Nations was mentioned in a Republican meeting.

The calm and determined demonstrations against it as embodying those objectionable features by almost the entire vocal part of the American element in the audiences were not directed against the entire

idea of the League, which with those features excised the larger part of that element in the audiences would approve. But the storm of denunciation of the League in whatever form, which came from the pro-German and anti-British, who in the most successful and most completely camouflaged propaganda ever known, made it a point to be present in impressive numbers and more impressive demonstration at every Republican rally, so dominated such occasions as often to seem the unanimous expression of the spirit of the assembly.

Early in the campaign the writer made a serious though not exhaustive study of this manifestation. One of the earliest exhibitions of it was at the anniversary of an important national patriotic society held at Carnegie Hall in New York City. An able and eloquent speaker in making the opening address voiced sentiments strongly in favor of the League. An irreconcilable United States Senator in his address opposed and strongly condemned it. The first address was supported throughout with apparently sincere but not demonstrative applause from about half of the audience. The sallies of the Senator, not half so convincing, were greeted with demonstrations of hand-clapping and shouts which would appear excessive in volume if they came from an entire audience of twice the size.

In one of the Republican campaign meetings it was only by the keenest observation of which I was capable and by engaging in conversation after the meeting with some who I had observed had led the

applause but of whose nationality the eye gave no indication, that I was able to discover that they were either German or strongly pro-German. By straining to express as much sympathy with Germany and as much opposition to the League as honesty would permit (which seemed to satisfy him that he had found an ally) I got from one of them the expression that he and his kind had found a rich lead and intended to work it to the utmost limit. This was followed by the suggestion that I with as many friends as I could take with me, attend every meeting when possible where a similar opportunity might occur. On another occasion I received like suggestions from an intelligent and quick-witted Irishman, or rather a man of Irish descent who was so American in appearance and accent that he might easily have passed for a descendant of a *Mayflower* pilgrim.

These were fair samples of the men who started, directed and urged the applause at every favorable opportunity to damage the popularity of the League. They were well supported by large numbers who had undoubtedly attended for just that service, while they who are always ready to go with the majority side in the applause helped to swell the chorus. These, constantly under its influence, as the weeks went on grew in opposition to anything that could fall under the charge of approaching an "entangling alliance."

It is true that many German citizens of our country, probably a considerable majority of them, be-

fore there was a world war in which Germany became our enemy, were adherents of the Republican party. But in that applause and expression of sentiment they were not Republican. They were not Republican in their position of opposition to the League, the inception of that opposition in their minds nor in the grounds upon which it was based.

They looked upon the League as a product of the Allies to be used against Germany. As to the Treaty of which the League is a part, they regarded it as the abomination of desolation spoken of by Daniel the Prophet. And the League was its instrument to force Germany to comply with its abominated terms.

The concealment or suppression of their allegiance to the Fatherland which our entry into the war against Germany had rigidly imposed upon them and which naturally continued after the Armistice, had become almost unbearable. It was as a suppressed volcano to which this opportunity to strike at the League gave the first and only free vent.

It gave also the opportunity to express their hatred of Great Britain which next to love for Germany held first place in their hearts. Great Britain they believed to be personified and enthroned in power in the League. They could not give open expression of their love for their own country, but they could give vent to what that suppressed love doubly intensified, hatred of England, hatred of the League of Nations. It was their only possible chance to give public vent to the German love the

suppression of which was almost choking them, by expression of hate for Germany's deadliest foe which they saw incarnated in the League.

That relief had become the supreme happiness of their otherwise restrained and melancholy existence. They needed no urging to go to a Republican meeting where the hatred thing was sure to be denounced by able oratory, and no effort was needed to start or stimulate that demonstration of applause. The Irish patriot was also there with his love for Ireland, which meant hate for the League which gave to Ireland's oppressor six votes in the League Assembly to America's one and Ireland's none! Every time he hit it he felt that he had struck a blow at the British and for Irish freedom. It became something more than a Republican gathering when invaded by these forces of confusion. But the applause was natural, spontaneous, sincere and tremendously earnest. It was that which made it so successful as a camouflage.

This could not fail to have a great reflex influence upon the speakers in the campaign. Even the most stalwart and self-possessed were to some extent affected by it. They who were easily susceptible to its seductive influence lost themselves completely and, convinced that the Republican party was by an enormous majority determined on the destruction of the League of Nations, were ready upon every occasion to denounce it in unmeasured terms.

Many of these, aided by their more immediate followers, have since been quite honestly among the

greatest disseminators of the conception of the Republican vote which would make it a rejection of the League outright, if not indeed the rejection of any kind of vital union with the nations of Europe.

As time went on the orator learned that flings either at the League or "our traditional enemy" could always be relied upon to bring from his audience the response which a speaker naturally likes to hear and which would make his speech a popular success.

If to the average member of the audience it was not apparent, it would be particularly difficult if not impossible for a speaker attentive to his own thoughts, even though warned in advance, to detect the origin of that demonstration, so honest was its expression. There was no counterfeit in it. It was unquestionably genuine.

In the excitement of a heated political campaign the fact that chambers of commerce, industrial, educational and religious assemblies, labor societies and student groups all over the country, representative of the average sentiment of the people, had for months by great majorities been earnestly calling for our entry into the League upon some fair basis of compromise that would start the world's peace machinery going while satisfying American opinion, was lost sight of and forgotten under the influence of that German-Irish denunciation, which was mistaken for American and Republican.

The man who in his intercourse with men in business, in his church, his club and other social rela-

tions had found a great majority to be ardently in favor of our entry into the League of Nations upon some basis of compromise as to the reservations, was surprised and perplexed by these manifestations. He could not understand how so great a change could come over the people as it were in a night. He began to ask himself the question if after all the majority of Republicans could be with the "bitter-ender" Senators in their determination to defeat the League outright.

Those in the audience who for some considerable time had observed a trend away from the League in its more objectionable and most criticized features, were led by these demonstrations to believe opposition to it to be of much larger proportions and much more ominous in its portent than it was in fact.

It hushed to silence many a firm believer in the importance of preserving the League of Nations as a foundation to build upon, for while still holding to his faith that Republican statesmanship would ultimately come to see that that offered the best solution of the perplexing international problem, he was disposed to say to himself, "What is the use of trying to use reason with the mad populace?"

Senator Harding himself could not fail to be profoundly impressed by it, for in this respect the audiences to which he spoke were in most cases not much different. No doubt he, as did other speakers, believed it to be a fair expression of average Republican sentiment. But there were times when he rec-

ognized its source and courageously resisted it. Few men in his position would have possessed the moral courage before such an audience to reply as he did to an Irish Catholic priest who interrupted him to demand the promise of aid for Irish independence, when he let it be plainly understood that he deprecated any interference by our country in the internal affairs of a friendly nation.

The makers of this applause were not much to blame. The German loved his Fatherland, the Irishman his Emerald Isle. And, as we have seen, both sincerely hated the League which they believed to be against the interests of the lands and peoples they loved. Who could condemn them for it? But the deception was complete, whether intended or not. Its very sincerity and naturalness made it seem the expression of the consensus of the opinion and sentiment of the assemblage.

But it is true beyond question that behind that honest expression there was effective organization and efficient management. When the very able promoters of pro-German and anti-British propaganda in this country discovered what had come about in a very natural way and saw in it the greatest opportunity for a complete camouflaged propaganda ever offered, they very naturally made the most of it. Naturally too, without any thought that there was a foreign inspired conspiracy behind it, other uncompromising foes of the League enthusiastically joined in the demonstration.

Attend any great Republican gathering, particu-

larly in the cities where the German and Irish populations are large, and that concealed propaganda would be found exerting all its force in a great offensive against the League. But because of the sincerity and earnestness of its actual demonstration, very few had the suspicion that more than nine-tenths of it came from men and women who in that opposition were, as we have seen, neither Republican nor American.

Among the causes for the development of a very hurtful misunderstanding, that may easily take first place. A good second to it was the Republican campaign necessity to conduct a vigorous offensive against the superstate and entangling features of the League without any special need to approve the good and most important provisions which the Lodge reservations would leave in its constitution.

Next in efficiency among its causes and supports was and is the remarkably bold self-assertiveness and confident claims during the campaign and since, of certain irreconcilables who are conspicuous in the party, and their honest belief and determination to make others believe that they made the issues and dominated the campaign and that the result is their complete vindication and the endorsement of their position.

Among other causes which may occur to the mind of the reader, was the natural but very unfortunate attitude of the warm friends and advocates of the League who leaving the party on its account, distrusted and belittled every party expression in its

favor while attributing the utmost importance and giving the maximum of prominence to any pronouncement against it or in favor of Mr. Harding's alternative proposition, an association of nations or against entanglement in the affairs of Europe.

In this they were warmly and very ably supported by the natural tendency of Senator Harding's political opponents to paint in platform addresses and in newspaper reports, articles and editorials, his utterances and those of other Republican leaders as black as possible in their effort to win pro-League members of the party over to their side. And these are the very men who most desire our entry into the League of Nations, who by their sincere but much mistaken attitude in this matter are doing their best to encourage a view which more than anything else will, if it becomes prevalent, utterly defeat it.

All these influences could not fail to exert a powerful tendency to produce and sustain the hurtful and lamentable misinterpretation of the Republican triumph in the 1920 election, which in every respect but malignant intent, may be justly characterized as the great deception.

But, it will be asked, is there not anything to be said on the other side in addition to the sayings of Senator Harding in strong opposition to our entering the League of Nations, and against our becoming in any way enmeshed in the politics and squabbles of Europe? Opposed to the view of the misinterpretation presented, was not the vote in the Republican presidential primaries for Hiram Johnson, the

arch-irreconcilable, impressive? To a superficial view it was.

And did it not show an anti-League vote that would indicate that it is not so much a misconception after all to believe that the Harding vote was against the League? Upon the surface it may seem so, but dig below the surface and the answer is no.

Let us briefly consider the results in the only states in which legal primary elections for presidential nominees were held in which Senator Johnson figured to any large extent.

In North Dakota, the socialistic state, Johnson unresisted received 30,873. In Illinois, where his followers conducted a still hunt to surprise the Lowden forces, his vote was 56,240, made up almost entirely of Mayor Thompson's Cook County pro-German and other following and of pro-Germans and anti-British in other parts of the State, while the votes of Wood and Lowden (Lodge-reservations League candidates), not to mention the small unorganized Hoover vote, aggregated 329,595, beating him within a fraction of six to one.

In Indiana and Michigan the Wood and Lowden vote was nearly double his. In Nebraska the Johnson vote was 63,161, while the combined votes of Wood and General Pershing, another League supporter, was 70,054. His vote in Oregon was 46,143, with the votes of Wood, Lowden and Hoover totaling 72,928. Besides socialistic North Dakota and his own California, where the half unorganized vote

for Hoover, his sole competitor, was large enough to give him much uneasiness, the only state he carried by an actual majority was Montana, where he was practically unopposed and his vote was 21,034.

But his vote was not entirely anti-League. The personal equation entered to some extent, and in the Northwest Senator Johnson is a very popular man. He probably received the larger part of the Progressive vote, since he is the leading exponent of progressive policies since the unfortunate passing of Roosevelt.

In estimating the value of the Johnson primary vote as an indication of the size of the Republican anti-League vote, it is also well to remember that it is practically certain that he polled almost the entire German and pro-German and anti-British vote in every state where he was a primary candidate. Assuming that to be true we must conclude that in most of those states the distinctively Republican vote which he received was a small minority of the votes cast for him and a very sad minority of the total Republican primary vote.

It is also safe to assume that these same pro-German and anti-British elements made not only the enthusiasm but by a large majority the numbers at his meetings during the primaries as well as in the election campaign, and that the tremendous enthusiasm which they brought to those meetings, not only as witnessed and felt at the meetings but as heralded throughout the country, added to his vote many of those who are always ready to yield to the attraction

of apparent success, and who flocking to his standard irrespective of their views of the League aided in very much deceiving Senator Johnson himself as to the strength of his *Republican* and *American* following.

CHAPTER VII.

THE GREAT HARM IT MAY DO

THERE is a small group of men in the Senate, I need not name them, who partly because it gives support to their known position in respect to our international relations and because they ardently desired it to be so, are the worst victims of the misinterpretation of the vote to which we have given consideration. They are also its most zealous and most successful promoters.

I will not here dispute that they are sincere in their position of opposition to our union with other nations for the prevention of war, and in their interpretation of the election result in a way that would give that position the best possible support. But the situation created by their misinterpretation of the meaning and mandate of President Harding's seven million majority is harmful and threatening to a high degree. The threat is, as has been more than intimated, not to the League of Nations only, but to any association of nations and to the success of the administration which that great vote put into the place of power.

They would make it appear that the meaning of the unprecedented Harding vote is not that the American people want a new association of nations

in which the United States will take her rightful place beside the other nations of the world in a union of effort to undo the harm that an unparalleled war has wrought, and relieve our world of the peril and paralyzing dread of another world conflagration by making its recurrence improbable, nor that it is that we reach some possible basis of agreement by which we may enter the society of nations already formed for that purpose and beginning, though lamely, to function.

What they would have us believe is that the vote was an expression of the desire of the American people that we keep out of any association whatever with other nations and continue the aloofness and isolation that was our natural and proper position, until now when we have grown to be a big brother to the nations of Europe, in fact the biggest member of the family, in a relation so intimate that whether we would have it so or not, their larger interests are ours in so vital a sense that we cannot continue to ignore them.

In respect to the question of meeting in any adequate way the great opportunity and the urgent call for association with other nations for the prevention of war and the rescue of imperiled civilization, they would have us adopt a policy of doing nothing at all.

It is for President Harding and the American people to defeat them.

In the possibility that their will and purpose to satisfy the public by inaction until the people shall

become weary of the entire question and thus let it go by default may succeed, consists one of the gravest perils which now confronts our country and mankind.

Hence the infinite harm that may come of a misinterpretation of the meaning and mandate of the vote which would give them, and in fact is giving them, the largest possible encouragement and support; hence also the vital importance that any grave misinterpretation of that vote be corrected and cured.

In so far as it has succeeded in gaining a foothold, it is exerting a great Germanizing influence over our people which is anti-peace in that, if it achieves its purpose, it will leave the way open for Teuton Junkerism to bring on in another generation a new war of conquest unrestrained by any effective international combination which would make it futile. For the Potsdam gang, temporarily suppressed but not destroyed, is still plotting world war, which they well know a League or association of nations with the United States dominant in it would make hopeless. It is working to the encouragement of their hopes by making the great mass of our people indifferent to the entire question, a position advantageous to the war plans of Germany, and decidedly hurtful to our influence in world councils and world readjustment.

In its more immediate effect it is very helpful to the success of the plans of the irreconcilable Senate group by the emphasis it gives to their importance in

the national councils. Already it is making the irreconcilable forces in and out of the Senate extremely bold, and not only bold but full of confidence.

Their natural argument would be this—If the verdict of the people in the election was not only opposed to the features of the League which had been condemned by the party record and platform, but against all its features—against its spirit and purposes, then it may be construed as equally opposed to any other society of nations in which its spirit and purposes may find embodiment.

It would follow that there could be nothing which would respond to that supposed demand of the people as well as to carry out their own cherished policy of inaction; of repudiation by inaction of every form of international alliance to achieve the same ends. Thus their policy of sitting still and hands off would have received the approval of the nation.

At least they would gain this advantage, that with this sweeping rejection of the League by the people admitted, it could easily be made clear that there is not a quarter of the evidence to show that their vote was in support of any other proposal, and the indefiniteness of the result would give great encouragement and support to a policy of indefiniteness in respect to doing anything in the way of international union for the support of world peace.

The attitude and growing influence of these Senators cannot fail to exert an influence over the people

and to some extent with the President, their former associate.

Without doubt Senator Harding was unconsciously influenced to some extent, as all the Republican campaign speakers must have been, by the German-Irish propaganda which was described and exposed in the preceding chapter.

It would be not only possible but very natural if not indeed inevitable that he, starting out with stout assertion of Americanism as opposed to the super-government features of the Covenant which he denounced in unmeasured terms upon every occasion, should be profoundly influenced by that very strong expression of sentiment in his audiences, and it would be quite natural if the insistence and vehemence of that expression as he saw and felt it, should lead him to the conclusion that the great mass of the American people and particularly of the Republican majority, had determined on total rejection of the League of Nations in any form in which it might be possible.

But while he evidently was influenced by it, as any other man in his position standing day by day before these audiences and hearing that vociferous and very honest expression against the League certainly would be, he never lost his appreciation or failed in recognition of the good he saw to be in it, and as we have seen, he never failed on any occasion to declare that if the peace of Europe depended on it, he would recognize and conserve the features that were necessary to Europe's peace.

But it is the American way to respect the verdict of the majority in an election. Whatever may be their preferences, convince our people that the majority will is opposed to any association with other nations, and though it be with reluctance and much sorrow, they will quietly submit to it. The same would be even more true of the President, for was he not raised by the people to the exalted position which he occupies for the very purpose of executing their will?

As we have seen, the influence over the President of a misconception of the vote would be relieved by the imperative obligation resting upon him to consider the people's highest interests, as he may see them when the great responsibilities of his high position compel an exhaustive examination of the entire question of our international relations, and by the obligation to give due weight to the new conditions which may vitally affect those interests and world safety.

But there is another consideration quite beyond his control, which vitally affects the question to which we have been giving attention and makes a correction of any misconception of the meaning of the vote of tremendous importance. It is this: if that misconception should become and continue widely prevalent, it would be the one and only thing that would enable the irreconcilable Senators to draw to their side such other Senate support as could defeat any proposal which he may make for a vital union with other nations for the preservation of peace,

either in a new association of nations or in the existing League.

If in the final working out of his plan it proves to be of real value to the world, a reasonable assurance of future world peace, as there are excellent reasons to believe and expect, it will not be the pro-League Republicans who will oppose and defeat him, nor should he be obstructed by broad minded Senators of the opposing political party. Opposition and defeat, if defeat be his fate, will come only from irreconcilable forces in the Senate and nation. President Harding may not have seriously considered this. But he will know it before long if the leopard does not change his spots.

The "Battalion of Death" is stronger in the Senate than it was before the election. But it is not strong enough to defeat the administration and the American people except by the mighty aid of that great deception. Let that deception or misconception become widely accepted and grow powerful, and when the President presents his plan, if there be in it any proposal which that coterie in the Senate would wish to defeat, the influence of that misinterpretation of the vote will become the instrument in their hands by which they may accomplish their purpose. Only by the argument that the people are with them will they be able to rally the Senate support by which their designs may succeed.

To expose and correct that false interpretation is now the most important task presented to the friends of world organization for the preservation of peace.

If such a cabal in the Senate is organized to defeat such proposals as may be expected to emanate from the great-hearted and sure man at the White House, I would hate to believe that Senator Lodge will be one of his foes in that effort to oppose. It is true that he went before the Resolutions Committee at Chicago and for the sake of peace in the Convention demanded that there be omitted from the plank on international relations an endorsement of the Lodge reservations by name. It is true that when a party split impended in the Senate he more than once seemed to favor or yield to the reactionaries. But it was always from his viewpoint in the interests of party harmony which it particularly devolved upon him to preserve in the Senate at a time approaching a national election in which party harmony would be essential to success. It is also true that he has sometimes made disquieting remarks.

What I have written does not excuse his course. It merely explains it. It would have been better and nobler if he had risen above the exigencies of party leadership and expediency and made himself the moral leader of his party in the Senate, which he clearly was not.

But it should be remembered that at the most critical time he took into his own hands the leadership of the forces of compromise in the Senate and despite the opposition of the reactionaries, led those forces so far that if President Wilson had met them, the United States would, before there was any submission of the question to the perils of a partisan elec-

tion, have become a member of the League of Nations with reservations which while more than sufficiently protecting American independence would have left in full force in the Covenant its best peace-protecting powers and put behind our membership in the League the united will of this entire nation.

I would hope that in another critical hour, which may come when the League or new Association proposal of this administration (whichever it may be), is before the Senate and in need of the two-thirds vote required to make it law, he may again put himself at the head of the forces of compromise and regain his lost glory by leading them on to the victory that will give final and enduring triumph to the war against war.

But he can hardly be expected to take that leadership if he is a victim of the deception as to the meaning and mandate of the Republican vote in the recent national election with which many of his colleagues in the Senate are now acutely suffering.

But the gravest menace of the great deception is in its influence directly upon the mind of the President. Aside from the reflex influence upon him of the German-Irish inspired and directed exhibition of hostility to the League of Nations which has been noted, it would be very natural if Senator Harding, deeply interested in his idea of an Association of Nations, should interpret the enthusiasm of the audiences he addressed as meaning that the people generally approved and accepted his idea, and that to

put it into effect was the mandate of the vote that elected him.

Whether his Association idea is a good one or not, it could not fail to be harmful to his usefulness as the first representative of the people to proceed upon the false assumption that such was the mandate of the people. There was no such mandate. They have not accepted it. They did not know what it was and do not now know what it is. They are waiting with much hopeful expectation and some apprehension for its unfolding. But it must be difficult for any man in the President's position, having his own plan much at heart, to bring himself to believe that the enthusiasm which everywhere met him, did not mean entire sympathy with and approval of that which, though undefined, he clearly showed to have first place in his mind.

A fair consideration of these facts would bring him to see that what he admitted was in respect to plan and details, and indeed in essential method, not at all defined in his own mind, could only be guessed at by his hearers. Certainly they could not have approved an indefinite plan, however much they may have applauded his earnest and forceful utterance.

But that is not worth the mention beside the gravity of the peril that would be in his acceptance of the view that the vote was against any organized and permanent union with other nations for the insurance of international justice. An acceptance of that view would be fatal to any achievement by this Administration for the insurance of world peace.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE EVOLUTION OF A PRO-LEAGUE REPUBLICAN.

IT should be interesting and also illuminating to trace the evolution which has taken place in the pro-League Republican mind. The average pro-League Republican started out with a willingness to take the Covenant almost whole as it came from Versailles. Soon he wanted it with mild reservations, and after a time was determinedly insistent that the President and the Democratic Senators abandon their stubborn opposition, which he regarded more academic than practical, and close with the Republican Senators on their offer of compromise proposed in the Lodge reservations.

Now he seems willing, and in fact anxious for the chance to take almost anything that will get us into some association with other nations that will offer a warrant of permanence and give fair promise of the maintenance of world peace.

That looks like considerable movement if not evolution. But a fair analysis will, I think, show that in reaching these various positions he has been both loyal and consistent and very nearly if not quite right. More, it will show that his change in each case was to a position which, in the conditions existing at the time, gave the only possible promise of achieve-

ment of the purpose which he started out to accomplish and that actuated him in every move.

It should be observed that we are not describing the average Republican but a Republican who was sincerely and earnestly pro-League to whose mind the question had no relation to politics.

The typical pro-League Republican, however much of an idealist he may have been at heart, was eminently practical in his acts. Out to fight for a cause, for the achievement of an end in which he was intensely interested, he was eager to grasp every opportunity, to seize every advantage to attain it. It was not to his mind a matter of form or of method, but of results.

In this respect his attitude was like that of a general in the field, ready for any change of position that would give encouraging promise of arrival at the end to be attained, which was victory. In the case of the general, it was victory for his honor and his country. In this case it was victory for his race. And that was in any man able to rise above partisan considerations, and therefore in the conscientious pro-league Republican, the controlling if not the whole motive and purpose that moved him and decided his course. It was to secure something of enduring value to the world and take no risk to lose it.

In that sense he was an opportunist, ready to forsake any position to gain an advantage for mankind. His politics was the conservation of the best interests of the world.

I will offer in illustration through the remainder

of the chapter, the case of one with whom I happen to be acquainted. Beside the fact that I am familiar with it, I take this particular case because there was probably not a man upon the earth more determined than he to go over the top in doing his full part to get the United States into effective alliance with other nations to end, in so far as could be possible, the inexpressible folly and wickedness of war. There could have been no sincerer friend of the cause.

In respect to that extreme intensity of interest, his is by no means an average case. It is selected because it personifies, not in intensity but in sincerity and illustrates in its direction and purpose merely, the average feelings, desires, hopes and fears of the conscientious Republican at different stages of progress in whose regard and interest the question is outside of and far transcends any partisan consideration.

It is reasonably certain that through the greater part of the narrative the reader will marvel at the taking of this man's experience to illustrate that of the average. It is hoped that at the end of the story the propriety and wisdom of so doing will appear.

The man whose activities and experiences we are to relate, early realized that we would not join with other nations even in so beneficent a cause as that of the prevention of war without a compromise of conflicting opinions in which narrow and partisan considerations would have weight and the frailties of human nature exert their influence.

With that idea prominent in his mind he followed a course invariably consistent with it.

While the League Covenant was provisional and subject to suggestions as to changes, he strongly criticized some of its features and proposed alterations which he believed would much improve it.

Seeking to use persuasion with both sides, he urged Republican Senators and party leaders to make it clear to the public that they were not opposed to the general principles or purposes of the League, but only to certain objectionable features in the provisional draft which might be eliminated or modified—that they make their criticism constructive and not destructive and particularly that they avoid making the question a party issue.

The day before the appearance of President Wilson and Mr. Taft upon the same platform before a great audience in the Metropolitan Opera House, which was just prior to the return of the President to Paris, he wrote to Mr. Taft (who in terms much less diplomatic than was his wont, had scored the recalcitrant Republican Senators for their opposition), a letter which said:

“May I very respectfully and earnestly request that you consider if, in the present situation it would not be a real and great service if in your address on Tuesday evening you would make it very clear and pronounced, not only that you recognize that the provisional draft of the League constitution is not a perfect document, but also that, being provisional, it is quite in order to offer suggestions and proposals to

amend it, and that such proposals if of real and large value will without doubt be given fair consideration."

To accent the impression he also caused the letter to be printed in the form of a suggestion in a newspaper which he felt sure Mr. Taft would read. This was followed by a telegram to President Wilson containing a similar suggestion. Mr. Taft fully responded to the suggestion in his address, both in his introduction and conclusion. The telegram to Mr. Wilson was not delivered until after his address had been made.

After the President had returned to Paris, our pro-League Republican set himself to work to do the best he could to cause it to be impressed upon the President's mind that important changes in the Covenant must be conceded to satisfy American opinion and avoid defeat in the Senate, while at the same time he tried to induce the Republican Senators to agree upon and publicly state the exact changes which would be necessary to secure their support. Thus would the President and the premiers of Europe know definitely what would be required to secure the membership of the United States in the League, while on the other hand the Senators would be, with the same definiteness, committed to ratify the Treaty upon terms then satisfactory to them.

By that committal would be avoided the almost inevitable result of a prolonged partisan strife; the

augmentation of demands to a degree that would make agreement nearly if not quite impossible.

With these thoughts, on March 1st, 1919, he wrote a letter in duplicate to Senators Lodge and Harding, and to other national Republican leaders which was in part as follows:

“Since a soon to be adjourned Senate gives no opportunity for a Senate resolution, I would much like to see a well considered and well drawn up statement, numerously signed by the *reasonable* Republican Senators, that will give the irreducible minimum (not too drastic or impossible) of the amendments to the League of Nations Constitution that will be required to secure their votes for ratification, and added to that a request merely, for the fair consideration of other changes that may seem desirable.

“Unless something of the sort is done the League plan is in great danger of being adopted in a form in which it will fail to be ratified by the Senate and the entire scheme of the League for Peace will collapse *with the blame resting on the Republican party*. . . . I much fear that some of our leaders are taking a very mistaken course in opposing the League plan in its entirety rather than let it be very distinctly known that they heartily espouse the cause of the League of Nations and only seek by amendment to correct its more serious faults.”

To what extent the Senators responded to the suggestions of this letter is not for recital in this book.

It was almost the same day when our pro-League Republican wrote to Colonel House and also to Mr.

B. M. Baruch, then in Paris (with both of whom he had formed a pleasant acquaintance), letters in which, after references very friendly to President Wilson he said: "Opinion here among many of the best men irrespective of party, is that the President is too autocratic; that he wants to have his own way and do everything himself and will listen to advice from no one, and that that position of stubbornness on his part is seriously endangering the chances of ratification in the Senate." He then introduced a diplomatic stroke by adding, "You will observe that I am not writing in expression of opinion, but as a reporter of opinion," and suggested that they make thorough inquiries for themselves.

This was followed by the bold request, "I will be very much pleased if you will show this to the President. He is too large a man to resent a frank and friendly expression though in criticism which is prompted only by a very deep interest in his own great cause." The more than usual friendliness shown in a letter received not many days later from Mr. Wilson in reply to a communication upon a very different subject, convinced him that either Colonel House or Mr. Baruch had complied with his request.

Though he had his own proposals of changes which he thought ought to be made in the constitution of the League of Nations and severely criticized some of its provisions, when the final draft of the Covenant was made public he at once urged with all the powers he possessed that the Treaty, of which it was a part, be ratified with only mild reservations that

would not threaten to defeat our entry through rejection by the nations of Europe.

His position was that a big, powerful and courageous nation protected by the provision in its Constitution by which it could not be called to war without the affirmative act of its Congress in each specific case, retaining its positive power of veto by its own vote in the Council and having the right to withdraw after two years if not satisfied, would be taking no risk equal to the peril to civilization which must come through our refusal to be a part of the world combination for its protection, in which peril we would be inextricably involved.

Further, he contended that with our great influence and power and the dependence of other nations upon our moral and material support, the withdrawal clause would be a lever which, discreetly used, would enable us while in membership in the League to bring about such a reformation of it as would bring it into conformity with American ideals, and make it a much more dependable organization of international forces for the correction of the evils of war and its ultimate elimination from the practice of nations.

Though himself a Republican, he severely criticized and opposed some of the Lodge reservations as unnecessary and needlessly offensive in tone and expression. But when, in November, 1919, it became evident that they offered the irreducible minimum of concession that the Republican side of the Senate would agree to make and thus had become the only

basis of compromise by which our entry into the League of Nations could become an accomplished fact, he urged and continued to urge with all the energy and wisdom of which he was capable, that those reservations be accepted as the best obtainable and the Treaty be ratified upon the Republican terms.

When the Republican Senate proposal of reservations was again offered in March, 1920, he more earnestly than ever urged their acceptance as the last opportunity to insure our becoming a member.

He particularly deplored the risking of the entire vital question of our entry into the League to the perils of a partisan political campaign as unnecessary and inexcusable. It was inexcusable in his mind, because by acceptance of the Republican proposal we could enter with the most effective provisions of the Covenant left in full force. Thus we would secure beyond any possibility of recall, a half a loaf of relief to a needy world with the door not closed to appeal to the electorate for the other half, if such an appeal should be desired.

With that feeling, when the compromise failed he repudiated the leadership that preferred submission of the entire question of our entering the League to the perils of a partisan election. In his belief, to continue in power the party responsible for that decision would mean only a renewal of futile strife. On the other hand, he believed that if that party went down in defeat and to the opposing party was

given the responsibility through the support of the friends of the League, and with pro-League Republicans still in both numbers and position strong in its councils, there would be good hope that we would either enter the League or form some other association with the nations of Europe equally effective for the prevention of war.

Influenced by these considerations he supported the Republican ticket in the national election and is now trying to work in so far as he may in cooperation with President Harding for world peace, quite willing to approve either our entry into the League with reservations safeguarding American independence or a new association of nations if the nations of Europe will join us in it, or anything else that will reasonably assure the peace of the world.

I have with considered purpose selected in illustration of the evolution which went on in the minds of the average pro-League Republican, a man who was not of the average but who in some respects was a leader. A man selected from the average might be regarded as merely an individual case. But when a man is selected who (though in a limited degree), was a leader, and there is added the statement (which could be proved beyond any question whatever by a multitude of instances), that Republican leaders of much greater importance who were earnest advocates of the League, almost without exception made the same changes of position and at practically the same times, the evidence is reasonably

conclusive that the average pro-League Republican did the same thing. For it is a truth of common acceptance that what practically all the leaders will do the rank and file will do with them.

While relatively few of the leaders and the rank and file entered into his moves, their minds drifted as did his with the swift current of events, and enough of them joined him in his moves to prove that they were in the same current. As an instance, more than a thousand of their nationally known leaders at one time united with an equal number of well known Democrats in signed approval of a significant pro-League compromise proposal which he initiated and presented to President Wilson and the Senate.

There was another reason for the selection. He was a man the completeness of whose devotion to the cause he espoused cannot be questioned, and who put it so far above partisan considerations that he would have gone eagerly to the platform and to the polls to defeat the leaders of his party if he had believed that by the party's defeat and humiliation the cause of world peace would have gained. Therefore the changes of position, in his case at least, were due only to the conviction that the interests of that cause demanded them. It was that conviction, whether justified or not, that led him to support the Republican candidates.

These changes of pro-League Republican position have been referred to as an evolution. They were an evolution in the same way in which evolutions usu-

ally occur, by a natural and inevitable development. Were they not merely the sensible operations of sane and rational minds in the situations made by the changing conditions?

Could they have done otherwise and yet act consistently with the guiding purpose with which they started out, which was not to advance any particular idea or conception, but to gain for the benefit alike of our age and coming generations, the best insurance that could be had of the prevention of war and the preservation of civilization? I think not. But there will be opposing opinions.

The intention which has dictated this chapter has been to repeat in the form of a concrete and illuminating illustration the answer to the question, Why did pro-League Republicans vote for Harding? It should aid to a right interpretation of the meaning and mandate of the vote.

That this pro-League Republican, following the light of opportunity for his cause, as it appeared to him, arrived at the same destination as did other and more eminent Republicans who were earnest supporters of the League idea, merely shows that trend to have been an important Republican movement or evolution, and an essential part in the Republican triumph.

A list of all the eminent Republican leaders who arrived at that destination, coupled with words which fell from their lips or pens in acknowledgment of that arrival, would make an impressive demon-

stration of the meaning of much of Senator Harding's support. The requirement of brevity in this narration permits only the quotations from a very limited few which will be found in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IX.

VOICES OF THE GREAT LEADERS.

IN reviewing the pre-election attitude of the great party leaders in which will be found strong confirmation of all the foregoing, it is appropriate that we begin with the three who, by universal consent, stand at the front of the most highly honored of its members.

They are William Howard Taft, once President, nominated for a second term but defeated by a party split, the President of the League to Enforce Peace, and now by President Harding's appointment in the position of his heart's desire, that of Chief Justice of the United States; Elihu Root, one time gifted Senator, who has graced and honored two Cabinet positions including that of Secretary of State, the most distinguished political counsellor and presiding officer at National Conventions and described not only by the great Roosevelt but also by general consent both here and abroad as the possessor of the finest and most masterful mind of all our countrymen; and Charles Evans Hughes, twice Governor of the State of New York, once a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, the nominee of his party for the high office of President to which he barely missed

election by a strange fluke in the California vote, the trusted counsellor and idol of all the people and now the honored Secretary of State.

The attitude of all these was universally known, but since memories are short, it may not come amiss to quote them.

Mr. Taft in signed articles in *The Public Ledger* of Philadelphia and in interviews and notable addresses throughout the country strongly advised the friends of the League of Nations to vote for Senator Harding as the best if not the only hope for our entry into the League. It is sufficient for our purpose to quote only one of his pre-election expressions, that made by him in his address of October 20th (only two weeks before the election) at Bloomington, Indiana, in which he said:

“Mr. Harding’s attitude upon the League has been this, that in an earnest desire to help the other nations he was willing to vote for the League with the Republican reservations, and he did so twice. In anticipation of Executive responsibility and of initiative he does not wish to submit the Wilson League to the Senate. He prefers to negotiate with the leading powers, now in the League, to revise and amend the League by an agreement with those powers before submitting the matter to the Senate.

“Expressions that Mr. Harding ‘scrapped’ the League, has ‘repudiated’ it, are grossly unfair expressions. He has vigorously opposed Article X and the Monroe Doctrine provisions but he has not repudiated its other provisions and purposes.

“All inference that he is opposed to any league

or opposed to the present League when those features which he deems to be objectionable are removed, and when other features are added that he deems to be necessary, does him injustice.”

Immediately following the election of President Harding, in an article in *The Public Ledger* he said:

“The enemies of the League will maintain that the general verdict is one completely adverse to any league, but this will not be the reasonable judgment of those who have followed Mr. Harding’s promises in his speech of acceptance, in his speech of August 28, in his Des Moines speech and his Indianapolis speech.”

Mr. Elihu Root, following the request of Will H. Hays, now the Postmaster General and then Chairman of the Republican National Committee, who asked whether the Hague Court could not be so defined as to include the work supposed to be the object of the League of Nations, cabled in reply:

“Declaration on which Hays asks an opinion can not be defined. The Hague Court cannot be made to cover anything but justiciable questions. Matters of State policy must be dealt with by conference of powers. See explanation in my letter of March, 1919.

“It is very unwise to declare the League dead. . . . It would not be true. The League has hardly begun to function because the terms of peace have not yet been enforced by the victorious nations. Polish questions, for example, are properly being

handled by the foreign offices without any reference to the League. They are not the League's business.

"In my opinion, a new deal here from the beginning by abandoning the Versailles Treaty is impossible. To attempt it would bring chaos and an entire loss of results of the war and general disaster involving the United States. The only possible course is to keep the treaty, modifying it to meet the requirements of the Senate reservations and the Chicago platform and probably in some other respects.

"The precise way in which such modifications can be best made must be determined at the time in conference with the other parties. It is impossible to forecast the methods because conditions next March are necessarily uncertain. Now the central idea is that the deadlock resulted from President Wilson's perverse refusal to negotiate for the consent of other powers to Americanization of the treaty, but that our new Administration will secure that consent.

"A separate declaration of peace was justified only by President Wilson's refusal to act. After March 4 that will no longer be justifiable, unless other powers refuse to consent to modification, which I do not anticipate. Don't allow Cox to drive you off the ground of Harding's Senate vote and our platform. Keep to the simple issue, Americanization."

Since Mr. Root is generally credited with being the author of the compromise plank in the platform, this interpretation of it has special interest and value.

In the earlier letter to Chairman Hays to which Mr. Root refers in his cable message, there occurs this passage:

“There was a weakness in the system devised by The Hague Conference. It was that arbitration of justiciable questions was not made obligatory so that no nation could bring another before the court unless the defendant was willing to come, and there was no way to enforce a judgment.”

Referring to this the New York *Times* said:

“Mr. Root declared his belief that questions that were strictly ‘justiciable or judicial’ should be subjected to obligatory adjudication. This is in accord with a provision of the League Covenant. While he admitted that some difficulties were apparent with regard to questions of policy, he seemed to endorse the plan contained in the League covenant of making international conferences upon political questions compulsory in times of danger and practically impossible for any nation to keep out of them. He praised this scheme, although indicating what he regarded as some defects.”

Mr. Root’s advice to League supporters to favor Senator Harding’s election as our surest introduction to membership in that society of nations will be found in the next quotation, which for certain reasons occurs under the name of Mr. Hughes.

The advice of Mr. Charles E. Hughes may be found in the famous “Thirty-one Paper” of October 14th (a little more than two weeks prior to the election) of which he and Mr. Root are reputed to be joint authors, and which at any rate was signed by them and twenty-nine other eminent pro-League Republicans. Strongly advocating the election of

Mr. Harding and defining their own position in respect to the League of Nations, it is practically advice to all its friends to support the Harding ticket in its interests.

Because of its great importance and the influence of the names attached to it, it is here quoted in full:

“The undersigned, who desire that the United States shall do her full part in association with the other civilized nations to prevent war, have earnestly considered how we may contribute most effectively to that end by our votes in the coming election.

“The question between the candidates is not whether our country shall join in such an association. It is whether we shall join under an agreement containing the exact provisions negotiated by President Wilson at Paris, or under an agreement which omits or modifies some of those provisions that are very objectionable to great numbers of the American people.

“The paper signed by thirty-eight Republican Senators in March, 1919, before the League covenant was adopted at Paris, advised the President that the signers could not approve a treaty in the form then proposed, although it was ‘their sincere desire that the nations of the world should unite to promote peace and general disarmament.’

“A majority of the Senate voted to ratify the League Covenant with modifications, which there is good evidence to show would have been accepted by the other nations; but Mr. Wilson refused to accept these modifications, and insisted upon the agreement absolutely unchanged, and Democratic Senators sufficient in number to defeat the treaty as modified followed Mr. Wilson by voting against ratification.

“That is substantially the difference between the

parties now. The Democratic platform and candidate stand unqualifiedly for the agreement negotiated at Paris without substantial modification.

“On the other hand, the Republican platform says:

“ ‘The Republican Party stands for agreement among the nations to preserve the peace of the world. We believe that such an international association must be based upon international justice and must provide methods which shall maintain the rule of public right by the development of law and the decision of impartial courts; and which shall secure instant and general international conference whenever peace shall be threatened by political action so that the nations pledged to do and insist upon what is just and fair may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of war.’

“Mr. Harding said in his speech of August 28:

“ ‘There are distinctly two types of international relationship. One is an offensive and defensive alliance of great powers. . . . The other type is a society of free nations, or an association of free nations, or a league of free nations animated by considerations of right and justice instead of might and self-interest, and not merely proclaimed an agency in pursuit of peace, but so organized and so participated in as to make the actual attainment of peace a reasonable possibility. Such an association I favor with all my heart, and I would make no fine distinction as to whom credit is due. One need not care what it is called. Let it be an association, a society or a league, or what not. Our concern is solely with the substance, not the form thereof.’

“Mr. Harding has since repeatedly reaffirmed the declarations of this speech in the most positive terms.

“The question accordingly is not between a league or no league, but is whether certain provisions in the proposed league agreement shall be accepted unchanged or shall be changed.

“The contest is not about the principle of a league of nations, but is about the method of most effectively applying that principle to preserve peace.

“If the proposed changes in the Paris agreement were captious or without substantial grounds, one might question the sincerity of their advocates. This, however, is not the case.

“The principal change proposed concerns Article X of the League Covenant as negotiated at Paris. Mr. Wilson declares this to be ‘the heart of the League’ and the chief controversy is about this.

“Article X provides that the nations agreeing to the treaty shall ‘preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League.’

“That is an obligation of the most vital importance and it certainly binds every nation entering into it to go to war whenever war may be necessary to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any member of the League against external aggression.

“It is idle to say that Congress has power to refuse to authorize such a war, for whenever the treaty calls for war a refusal by Congress to pass the necessary resolution would be a refusal by our government to keep the obligation of the treaty. The alternative would be war or a breach of the solemnly pledged faith of the United States.

“We cannot regard such a provision as necessary or useful for a league to preserve peace.

“We have reached the conclusion that the true course to bring America into an effective league to

preserve peace is not by insisting with Mr. Cox upon the acceptance of such a provision as Article X, thus prolonging the unfortunate situation created by Mr. Wilson's insistence upon that article, but by frankly calling upon the other nations to agree to changes in the proposed agreement which will obviate this vital objection and other objections less the subject of dispute.

“For this course we can look only to the Republican Party and its candidate; the Democratic Party and Mr. Cox are not bound to follow it. The Republican Party is bound by every consideration of good faith to pursue such a course until the declared object is attained.

“The conditions of Europe make it essential that the stabilizing effect of the treaty already made between the European Powers shall not be lost by them and that the necessary changes be made by changing the terms of that treaty rather than by beginning entirely anew.

“That course Mr. Harding is willing to follow, for he said in his speech of August 28th:

“I would take and combine all that is good and excise all that is bad from both organizations (the Court and the League). This statement is broad enough to include the suggestion that if the League which has heretofore riveted our considerations and apprehensions has been so entwined and interwoven into the peace of Europe that its good must be preserved in order to stabilize the peace of that continent, then it can be amended or revised so that we may still have a remnant of the world's aspirations in 1918 builded into the world's highest conception of helpful cooperation in the ultimate realization.’

“We therefore believe that we can most effectively advance the cause of international cooperation to

promote peace by supporting Mr. Harding for election to the Presidency.

“October 14, 1920.”

The paper was signed by

Lyman Abbott,

Nicholas Murray Butler, President Columbia University.

Robert S. Brookings, President Washington University at St. Louis.

Paul D. Cravath.

Charles W. Dabney, President University of Cincinnati.

William H. P. Faunce, President, Brown University.

Frank J. Goodnow, President Johns Hopkins University.

Warren Gregory, San Francisco.

John Grier Hibben, President Princeton University.

Herbert Hoover.

Charles Evans Hughes.

Alexander C. Humphries, President Stevens Institute of Technology.

Ernest M. Hopkins, President Dartmouth College.

William Lawrence, Bishop of Massachusetts.

Samuel McCune Lindsay, President, Academy Political Science, Columbia University.

A. Lawrence Lowell, President, Harvard University; Chairman Executive Committee League to Enforce Peace.

John Henry MacCracken, President Lafayette College.

Samuel Mather, Cleveland, Ohio.

George A. Plimpton, President Board of Trustees, Amherst College.

Henry S. Prichett, President, Carnegie Foundation
for Advancement of Teaching.

Charles A. Richmond, President Union College.

Elihu Root.

Jacob Gould Schurman, former President Cornell
University.

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War under Roose-
velt.

Oscar S. Straus, member Executive Committee
League to Enforce Peace and one time Cabinet
member.

Henry W. Taft, member Executive Committee
League to Enforce Peace.

Isaac M. Ullman, New Haven, member Executive
Committee League to Enforce Peace.

William Allen White, editor and author, Emporia,
Kansas.

George W. Wickersham, member Executive Commit-
tee League to Enforce Peace and former Attor-
ney General.

W. W. Willoughby, Professor Political Science,
Johns Hopkins University.

Ray Lyman Wilbur, President Leland Stanford Uni-
versity.

The names of former President Taft and others
of great influence are absent only for the reason that
they could not be reached at the time the declaration
was signed.

Commenting upon the concluding part of the state-
ment *The Outlook* of October 27th said, "That Mr.
Harding is willing to follow this course is indicated
in his speech of August 28th.*

* NOTE: The explanation of the omission of more personal quota-
tions from the expressions of Mr. Hughes is that, unlike others of

Having now shown in their own words the attitude of the three preeminent leaders of the party to have been in favor of Senator Harding's election distinctly in the interests of the League, we will see how it was with the three in preeminent popular leadership as candidates for the party nomination to the office of President.

Their names come at once and without question to the reader's mind. They are Wood, Lowden, Hoover. Wood and Lowden were far in the lead both in presidential primaries and Convention. One or the other would have secured the nomination had not the "big bosses" in determination that neither should have it, with much skill played "the field" against them. Subtracting from the Johnson strength in primaries and Convention delegates the pro-German vote which was in the interests of Germany, and the anti-British vote which was for Ireland and neither of which was in that position Republican or all-American, their lead would have been so much greater that Senator Johnson would have been indeed a sorry "also ran."

Mr. Hoover, unsupported by organization, naturally could not equal the Wood or Lowden showing. But as to general popularity in the party and among all the people, it is commonly conceded that he led them all.

General Leonard D. Wood, soldier hero of the whom the author requested authentic quotations, he wrote that he had kept no record of them and was therefore unable to supply them. But his signature to the "31 Paper" is sufficient.

party, heir to Roosevelt's mantle, the most formidable aspirant for the presidential nomination and understood to be President Harding's choice for Governor General of the Philippines, in joint debate with Senator Poindexter in the primary contest in South Dakota announced his position as "Approval of the League of Nations with the Senate reservations—reservations which thoroughly Americanize it and leave America absolutely free and untrammelled to follow the only mandate she will ever accept—the mandate of American public opinion, the will of the American people."

Frank O. Lowden, twice Governor of Illinois, next to General Wood in primary and Convention support for the nomination, who was offered and declined a position in President Harding's Cabinet, said in the primary campaign statement of his policies:

"Another question is that of the League of Nations. I believe in the passage of the League of Nations Covenant with reservations. I defend the action of Senators who insisted upon reservations to the charter submitted to them. . . . When the Republican party is in power we shall, I hope, proceed to establish this machinery for adjusting international differences."

In concluding his frank and manly reply to the campaign questions of Senator Borah as to his position as a candidate he said, "I therefore hope that the treaty may be ratified promptly with the reservations, in substance, already adopted by the Senate."

Herbert Hoover, now conspicuous in the Cabinet of President Harding and in the councils of the Government, needs no encomium and no introduction to the people of the United States or of the world. It is enough to say that he is Herbert Hoover.

His position in the campaign was defined with such clearness and emphasis and was so generally and well understood, it would seem hardly necessary to quote him here. But the reader would be keenly disappointed if his utterances were omitted, and they are so important and well put and were so influential, that to exclude them would be a serious loss.

In an interview with him shortly before his first speech in the campaign, the author went to the unnecessary pains to say to him, what he said to many others, "The gravest peril to the cause of peace seems to me to be this, that Johnson and Borah believe and are making the party and the country believe that they have made the issues and are dominating the campaign. If that false impression is allowed to go unchallenged, when they return to the Senate they will be able to draw to their side such Senate support as will enable them to block completely Senator Harding when as President he invites approval either of the existing League with reservations or any other worth-while association of nations which he may propose. To offset that, is it not the obligation of each and every nationally known pro-League Republican leader to get to the front in support of Senator Harding and make it plain upon every possible occasion that they advo-

cate his election because they favor the League or its equivalent in an association of nations, and trust Mr. Harding when elected to make good his promises to put one or the other through?"

Mr. Hoover's only reply to this question was, "I am to speak in Indianapolis next Thursday. Read my speech." The author and the entire Republican party read it with very general satisfaction. No apology is offered for quoting at considerable length the parts that refer to the question to which we are giving consideration. They here follow:

"Inasmuch as forty nations, comprising three-quarters of the people of the globe, have embraced the 'League of Nations' as a term expressing certain ideas, I prefer that term, but I care little for terminology. The essential thing is that the Republican party has pledged itself by platform, by the actions of its majority in the Senate, by the repeated statements of Senator Harding, that they undertake the fundamental mission to put into living being the principle of an organized association of nations for the preservation of peace. The carrying out of that promise is the test of the entire sincerity, integrity and statesmanship of the Republican party." . . .

"The Republican party has indeed pledged itself against the unmodified Covenant and those who support the party are indeed voting against some of the methods of the Covenant in putting this great principle into action. But this position of the party is as far as daylight from dark from the attitude of those who wish no League or no association for those purposes. If there be persons supporting the Republican party today on the belief or hope that this

party is the avenue to destruction of this great principle, that the party will not with sincerity and statesmanship carry out their pledges to bring it into effect, then they are counting on the insincerity and the infidelity of the Republican party and its nominee for the Presidency. I do not believe it would fail, or I would not be here at this moment. If, by any chance, it should fail, it will have made a deeper wound in the American people than the temporary delay in our adherence to a League of Nations." . . .

"My personal view with regard to the practical development of a League is that some articles in the present treaty must be abandoned and some modified. But a great many parts of the present treaty are good and are intertwined with the stability of the world. They offer opportunity to secure cooperation of the great majority of nations who have joined it. Therefore, I believe that in keeping faith with the promise to use all that is good in the Covenant for the development of the great principle to which it has pledged itself practical Republican statesmanship must build upon the foundations of the existing treaty, and include in it the great step forward in international justice now settled by Senator Root." . . .

The following are quotations from articles by Mr. Hoover in the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* and the Chicago *Daily News*:

"The treaty, with its annexes, comprises a total of nearly 600 articles, of which some twenty-seven comprise the League Covenant. Only eight or ten have been under criticism and the great bulk of such criticism is directed alone to Article X. Entirely

aside from the Covenant articles, the remainder are not only the basis of European stability but are of great political and economic importance to the United States. . . .

“Aside from a few articles touched by the reservations, I have heard no suggestion that these articles should be drafted otherwise than as they appear in the treaty. . . .

“As to the Covenant of the League. The actual organization of the League is a going concern that has gained in membership some ten nations during the last sixty days to a total of thirty-nine nations, representing nearly 75 per cent. of the population of the globe with a number of new nations applying for admission. And aside from the powers it may exert in the prevention of war (which are the matters mainly in dispute with us) it is indeed as Senator Harding suggests intertwined in the actual stability and government of Europe. . . .

“I stand earnestly for a league of nations to minimize war, and moreover I stand for *the* League with alterations in the direction pointed by the Republican reservations. . . .

“I believe that the present Covenant with alterations indicated by the Republican reservations entirely covers such an association as I describe. I favor building upon the present League as a matter of practical statesmanship. Thirty-nine nations representing 75 per cent. of the people of the globe have accepted it. They are not going to consent to its destruction; they will accept alteration and improvement. The present League has functions connected with the execution of the Treaty of Versailles that make it an integral part of the stability of Europe, entirely aside from its functions in the prevention of war. By necessity of some reservoir

for insolvable problems, such as Danzig and Constantinople, the present League is intertwined in the stability of Europe and can not be torn down without again jeopardizing the world in war. The stability of Europe and its gradual recuperation is absolutely vital to every working man and every farmer in the United States. . . .”

Among other voices repeating the same affirmation of pro-League Republican faith was that of Calvin Coolidge, twice Governor of Massachusetts and now the Vice-President. In his address of October 28th (less than a week preceding the election), before the Young Republican Club in Carnegie Hall, New York, he said:

“If the security of Europe is so intertwined with the Versailles Treaty and the existing League of Nations that we can make the best progress by taking the good in that treaty and in that covenant and by excising or amending those things which are not consonant with American traditions and habits, surely the Republican platform permits of such a course; surely the public declarations of Senator Harding permit such a course.”

In that distinctly Republican gathering the outburst of applause which greeted this utterance compelled the speaker to wait in silence until it had subsided.

In an earlier address when the nomination was formally tendered to him he clearly disapproved of the League without reservations but distinctly ex-

pressed his approval of the action of the Republican Senators in voting for it with the reservations which by their votes had been attached to it.

W. Murray Crane, for three terms Governor of Massachusetts, then a United States Senator and for nearly twenty years a dominant member of the Republican National Committee, whose political influence in Massachusetts and throughout New England as a party leader was exceeded by no man, and who during his years in the Senate, together with Aldrich, dominated the party's policy in national legislation, stood stoutly for the League with reservations.

This silent but potential leader who seldom uttered a word in public, in the Convention Committee conferences at Chicago urged endorsement of the Treaty of Versailles and with effective reservations the League of Nations embodied in it. Following that, up to the day of his death, he quietly but effectively supported the Republican ticket distinctly as a friend and advocate of the League.

Among those who gave the same support upon the same grounds were William Allen White of Kansas, Henry J. Allen, the popular Governor of that State, Judge Nathan L. Miller, now Governor of New York, Charles S. Whitman, quite recently the Governor of the Empire State, Lyman J. Gage, Secretary of the Treasury under McKinley and Roosevelt, George W. Wickersham, Attorney General during the administration of President Taft, Charles D. Hilles, President of the National Republican Club, once

Chairman and still a member of the Republican National Committee, Theodore E. Burton, former United States Senator from Ohio, and many others of equal distinction in Republican politics who were known to be ardent advocates of our entry into the League.

There were many like Oscar S. Straus, former member of the National Cabinet, who was so strong in support of the League that he once said to the author, "My politics is the League of Nations," who seriously debated their course in no other interest than that of world peace, with the result that they united in urging support of Senator Harding's election as the best hope of our entry into the League of Nations upon the basis of reasonable compromise which Democratic statesmanship had rejected.

Among educators of national distinction who united in the same urging were scores of university and college presidents besides Drs. Lowell, Hibben, Butler, Schurman, Wilbur and others whose names appear attached to the "Thirty-one Paper." Among these were Frank Gunsaulus, Arnold Bennett Hall and Henry S. Drinker.

Many nationally known pastors and preachers of religion, not given to political discussion and activity, but deeply interested in the cause of peace and friendly to the League of Nations, let it be known that they favored the return of the Republican party to control of the government as the best promise of the realization of their hopes. Among these may be mentioned Lyman Abbott, Bishop Lawrence of

Massachusetts, S. Parkes Cadman, George R. Van De Water, Robert Watson, Nehemiah Boynton and Francis E. Clark, founder and head of the Society of Christian Endeavor, which has a membership of four millions. All of these were, not only as preachers and pastors but also as writers and platform speakers; moral leaders of great and wide influence.

One of them, Dr. Lyman Abbott, known everywhere throughout the land and universally respected as a broadminded, wise and sincere adviser, in an article under the title, "To the Uncertain Voter," printed in *The Outlook*, of which he has long been the Editor in Chief, opened the subject by saying in his usual unmistakable way,

"Ever since 1895 I have been an advocate of a League of Nations, and am so still. In this article I am to put before the uncertain voter two considerations which have led me, as an independent and an advocate of a League of Nations, to decision to vote for Mr. Harding in the ensuing election."

In army and navy circles, and generally throughout the country, the views of General Pershing and Admiral Sims were understood to be in consonance with those expressed by General Wood and Governor Lowden. Though the rules of the Departments under which they held their commands prevented their vocal expression in the campaign, that general understanding as to their positions had its influence.

In addition to what the foregoing reveals as to the position of political and moral leaders in the party,

it is so commonly known that there is no need to offer evidences to support it, that the great business, industrial and financial leaders who adhered to the party were, in general, at the time the nominations were made, strongly in favor of our entry into the League upon some fair basis of compromise, as was evidenced by the almost unanimous recommendations of the societies and assemblies of which they were an important part, and also by their own individual expressions.

Even Senator Lodge gave encouragement to pro-League Republicans when in a letter to George R. Bishop of New York City, of date of July 1, 1920, and published in the *Tribune* of July 30 in that year, he wrote:

“The passage you quote from my letter [i. e., a prior one wherein the Senator described his efforts to get the treaty ratified] represented my position then and represents it now. I have never changed it. The proof that I was ready to ratify the treaty is that I voted twice to ratify it with reservations. As for meeting all the charges the Democrats make, of course that is perfectly useless. One can only trust to the facts, which is what I do. Of course, the resolution about the league in our platform does not repudiate what we have done before. It sustains the Senate in its attitude. It makes no promises for the future.”

Senator Borah, irreconcilable foe of the League and likewise of our joining any association of nations that he is, defended his support of Harding upon the

ground that there was no other alternative since the opposing candidate was even more friendly to the League.

In these days when women are so successfully asserting and exercising their political rights, it would be a grave oversight not to take account of the influence of the woman voter and leader. As to their position in relation to the question under consideration a significant showing has been made by the nation-wide poll recently taken by *The Woman Citizen*, the results of which appear in an earlier chapter.

I will here quote one very widely known and respected, Miss Gertrude Atherton, who, after explaining how by a temporary change in residence she had unintentionally lost her legal right to vote, said, "If I could vote I fancy it would be for Harding. I don't think there is much choice between the candidates. . . . But I prefer some one who is for the League of Nations with reservations."

An influence upon the vote not to be disregarded was that of the Republican newspaper press. There was probably not a state in the union in which there were not important newspapers supporting Senator Harding's election which stood with the pro-League Republican leaders in support of the proposition that the Republican party offered the best dependence for a rational entry of our country into the League.

Some of these that come readily to mind are the New York *Tribune*, the *Public Ledger* of Philadel-

phia, the Cincinnati *Times-Star*, the Toledo *Blade*, and the Chicago *Evening Post*. That staunch Republican newspaper and ardent advocate of the League, the Chicago *Daily News*, not satisfied with Harding's position at first, swung to him in the last weeks of the campaign. The Chicago *Tribune* while flaying without mercy the superstate features of the League, appealed for pro-League votes for Harding in an editorial entitled "A Vote for Cox is Against the League." Its leading political correspondent, Arthur Sears Henning, writing from Indiana in the heat of the campaign, said that all but two of the most important Republican newspapers in that state supported the League.

Other Republican newspapers of national importance supporting Harding's election as the best hope of our entry into the League were the Washington *Herald*, the Baltimore *American*, the Boston *Herald*, the St. Louis *Globe-Democrat*, and the Milwaukee *Sentinel*.

In Kansas the same position was taken by William Allen White's Emporia *Gazette* and Senator Arthur Capper's Topeka *Capital*. In Senator Johnson's state staunch Republican journals from Oakland to Fresno, including the Los Angeles *Times*, supported Hoover. In Borah's state the Boise *Statesman* supported the League. The Portland *Oregonian* headed the list of Republican papers of that state in telling the Republican representatives that the West wanted the League; and when Senator Cummings who is immensely popular in

Iowa, came out against it he was met with a column and a half protest from the Des Moines *Register*, and almost the entire Republican press of the state was strong in its support.

As to numerical strength, more than one hundred and fifty notably Republican newspapers in the country gave earnest support to the positions of Root, Hughes, Taft and Hoover, and to that of the majority of Republican Senators represented by Lenroot, Colt and Kellogg.

The *Public Ledger* published regularly the pro-League special editorials of Taft. The New York *Tribune* expressed a sentiment common to pro-League Republican papers when in its editorial leader, two days after the election, weighing the relative chances of the existing League and the establishment of a new organization, it said, "These alternative doors Senator Harding, in spite of the stresses of the campaign, has kept steadily open," and added, "Our own judgment is that the easiest way is to enter with proper reservations the League that is."

The voter remembered also Roosevelt's earnest insistence, often quoted in the campaign, that a League of Nations to enforce peace must emerge out of the ruin wrought by the war, and accepted it as good Republican doctrine.

With their own words to certify it every reasonable mind must, in spite of prejudice and preconception, concede it to be true that the greatest and most popular leaders in the party freely and pub-

licly gave that advice on the very eve of the election. With that conceded, does it not put too great a strain upon credulity to believe that the great mass of the party, who long had followed those leaders, and who themselves for more than a year had bent to the same insistence in respect to the League, did on election day repudiate that leadership and reversing their own long held position vote contrary to that advice?

Is it reasonable to assume that they voted in the belief that the election of Senator Harding would mean total rejection of the League when these great popular leaders assured them that it would mean acceptance of the League with reservations, when the platform and the candidate half promised it and the party record for two years pointed nowhere else?

How much less can any unbiased mind hold the view that it was a vote against our joining any union of nations whatever for the maintenance of peace? And that too, in addition to the above in the face of the fact that in his every speech Senator Harding named an association of nations as the one and only alternative to the League.

It would be strange indeed if the leaders talked and wrote that way and the people, their followers, voted the opposite way.

It is true that a small bloc of leaders, mostly members of the Senate, conspicuously led by two of their number, had opposed our entry into the League upon any terms. But they were a small minority

of the Republican Senators a great majority of whom had raised their voices and recorded their votes in favor of terms which, because of that majority, are known as "the Senate reservations."

Only one of that small cabal of irreconcilable opposition which, because of the smallness of their number and the obstinacy of their obstruction to the Republican will and purpose to enter the League with reservations, came to be known as "bitter-enders," cut any figure as a possible candidate of the party for the office of President. And the great bulk of his following in the primaries is accounted for by the pro-German and anti-British voters whose support was not upon either Republican or American grounds, but upon what they believed to be the interests of Germany and of Ireland.

Even with that support he was badly beaten and his vote seemed considerable, as has been shown by the official figures in an earlier chapter, only when compared with the divided votes cast for one of two or more opposing candidates who had declared in favor of the League with the Senate reservations.

Under what strange and unaccountable influence did the Republican voters reverse their known attitude of the entire year just preceding and their recorded votes in the primaries and on election day cast a secret ballot against the advice of their leaders, against the consistent party record and against their own long and consistently held position? And since it was a secret ballot, how does anybody know that they did?

The burden of proof rests with the irreconcilable leaders, who, lacking the support of facts, are trying by loud assertion to make out the case that they did. Have they submitted any convincing proofs to sustain the charge?

Unless very adequate reasons can be given to show a complete reversal of opinion during the four months of the presidential campaign, the only sane conclusion must be that on the day of the election, the great mass of both of the greater political parties voted for entry into the League of Nations, on the Republican side with strong safeguarding reservations, on the Democratic side with little reservation, in accordance with the best judgment of which they were individually capable.

No such adequate reasons have been given. Instead there has been offered bald and unreasoning assumption.

Can any one measure the degree of partisan prejudice that could enable a writer in a great metropolitan journal, in the face of all the facts, to say without being overwhelmed by a sense of his own gigantic presumption in saying it, that it is preposterous to claim that the seven million majority for Harding meant anything else than that the people of the United States rose up in repudiation not only of the League, but of our becoming a part of any association of nations whatever?

For that tremendous assumption the writer offered no reasons beyond his own bold declarations. Such a man is guided to his conclusions solely by his

own feelings and desires. I do not doubt that he is sincere, and that is a fair example of the prevailing argument that one hears from the man in the street in support of the great deception. The only real argument for it is the memory of the German-Irish-made demonstrations at Republican meetings, their reflex after-influence and the fact that a great many people believe it. All the other facts worth noting argue the other way. But what difference does that make to the unreasoning irreconcilables who will have it that everything means what they want it to mean, and to the unthinking who accept as true whatever is proclaimed with the loudest voice?

There is need to expose the deception, whether it be honest or intended, when wide credence is given to the absurd claim that the vote for Senator Harding was a repudiation of both League and association of nations in face of the fact that in nearly every speech in his campaign, in keeping with the platform assurance of an "international association" through which "the nations pledged to do and insist upon what is just and fair may exercise their influence and power for the prevention of war," he made emphatic declaration in favor of such association, if consideration for the peace of Europe should not require that we enter a revised and modified League.

Made totally blind by overmastering prejudice an honest man may interpret the vote to mean rejection of the League of Nations. But if there be statesmen and political leaders who in disregard of

all the compelling evidence of easily discerned facts would persuade the people that the election result is a mandate of the American voter against the entry of the United States into any society of nations for the preservation of peace, it will be a hard task to defend them against the charge of deception in its literal and worst sense or save them from the opprobrium which that deception would deserve.

They who flatter themselves that the people would quietly submit to a failure to join in a vital and effective union with other nations for the prevention of war, are destined to a rude awakening. That failure would be a flagrant and unforgivable violation of every pledge of the party leaders, the platform and the party record and of the plainest and most unequivocal promises of President Harding.

Not upon mere assertion—not upon vain determination to twist the truth to conform to the will and prejudices of a party group, not upon trivial things fished out of obscure corners of dark imagination, but upon open and commonly known, broad daylight and indisputable facts we submit the people's case to the unprejudiced and considerate judgment of reasonable men.

Apart from the subject of the chapter now concluded, it is not in any spirit of unkindness but with the best of good will that we may say to our President that we look to him to rise above personal ambition. That is the only road to greatness and the highest success. The supreme greatness of Wash-

ington and Lincoln was in their ability to forget self in the great hour of their country's need.

Cæsar and Napoleon are but examples of great men who have fallen before the temptations of inordinate ambition. There have been in recent American history more than one instance of a great man's self-defeat through listening to that temptation in the hour of supreme opportunity when the turning of a deaf ear to it would have crowned him with immortal fame.

It is an ever lurking peril to great men. No man is so high in the estimation of the people that he may not fall. Wilson was acclaimed not by a majority of seven millions of his countrymen, but by the world. And he fell. In the desire that his country yield to his imperious will and enter the League of Nations by the way of his personal conception and by no other, in respect to his country's share in it, he pulled down upon his own head the temple of his own creation.

There is this difference. Wilson was acclaimed for really great ideals which lifted him to the moral leadership of the world. The thirteen millions of American voters in their choice of Harding acclaimed not his ideals, but their trust in him to put into effect their own. They have not lost that faith. They do not believe that ambition other than the laudable one to serve their will and the world's great need, will come in to bring about another fall before the alluring temptation to devise and to use his country's unique position of power to create something

with which his own name will be associated in illustrious renown. They have faith in him as a wise man who would spurn such a course, which would be a betrayal of their confidence and of the world's great interests and his own inevitable undoing.

They expect him in the greatness of self-forgetfulness to see only the good of his people and the supreme interests of mankind. Thus he will be really great and history will take care of his fame.

CHAPTER X.

THE ULTIMATE AND GREATER REALIZATION.

IN all the preceding chapters it has been the author's effort to express, as accurately as he could, the pro-League Republican view. Since the League of Nations discussion had its inception in this country his mind has moved along the line of the pro-League Republican evolution described in the chapter immediately preceding this.

He has, however, long entertained and at times given public expression to thoughts somewhat different from, though not inconsistent with those which have held our attention. To some of these I now respectfully invite the reader's thoughtful consideration.

Can any League or association of nations which had or may have its origin in and is governed in its determinations by political expediency rather than by the fixed and definite principles of international law, long survive in the confidence of the peoples of the world and continue an effective agent for the preservation of peace? Will not the changing interests of the world, and the conscience and the matured judgment of mankind combine to decide that such an organization of nations, when it shall have served the temporary necessities of civi-

lization which have called the existing League and may call a new association into being, shall take second place and leave international law and court supreme over all?

Consistency if nothing more would compel the author to express the belief that it will, for he is not a recent convert to the idea. In a pamphlet on the Colonies published in February, 1919, and since in other pamphlets, in newspaper articles and in letters to many Senators, he made the same proposal. But in offering the proposal he never failed to urge that something very different, namely, the existing League of Nations, though far from ideal, was the immediate necessity for world stabilization. Perhaps he would now favor an association of nations in preference, the choice being dependent upon the character of the association and the willingness of the nations of Europe to join us in it.

May I quote from my pamphlet of much more than a year ago?

“Personally, I believe that if it were not for the necessity to make and hold new geographical lines, to form, restrict and stabilize new nationalities, to hold in leash an insane development of Bolshevism and to defeat an unfair German industrial and commercial conquest of Russia and the Baltic Provinces, which would banish the hope of future peace from the world, the present plan for a League of Nations would be totally wrong.

“Instead, its supreme idea, the center and soul of it, should be a complete and comprehensive code of international laws, one of which should be this, that

no nation or combination of nations shall ever again be allowed to take by conquest or hold by any form of duress the territory of another; and for the interpretation of that code of laws and its application to any case of alleged violation, there should be an International Court of Justice; not only arbitral but when necessary direct in the exercise of its jurisdiction to try any nation upon properly instituted charges of infraction.”

To quote from the edition of the pamphlet published soon after the Treaty was brought from Versailles:

“With the court, and not a political combination of nations, the supreme authority to which appeal must be made, the chief function of the League of Nations would be to enforce the court’s decrees. In the decisions of a court, composed as this naturally would be of the greatest jurists of the world and limited in its decisions to the law and the evidence there could be no large injustice and there would be no super-state.

“But as the great democracy of America, to meet an unparalleled emergency, rightly and wisely gave temporarily to the President autocratic powers, so now a situation unprecedented and unparalleled in the vastness of its possibilities for evil, justifies the temporary functioning of a League with the unusual powers conferred in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

“That is why I favor the right to withdraw—a right which will not be lightly exercised by any nation, but which some time in the future, wisely asserted by such liberty-loving and law-respecting nations as the United States, Great Britain and

France, may force a revision and reformation that will put international law and an international court above all. Such an authority only a nation outlawed by its own crime would ever have need to fear.’’

The writer is so deeply imbued with the idea of a court which shall be supreme over all that he could not refrain from introducing it in his leaflet urging the compromise “Half a Loaf League Plan” about the time of the presentation of that plan to the President and to the Senate leaders, which was in late March of 1920. In that leaflet the thought was expressed in the following terms:

“Most of us think we can plan a better League of Nations. There is in the Covenant itself the material for the making of a better one through a comprehensive code of international laws, a Supreme Court of International Justice and a League of Nations the chief function of which shall be to enforce the Court’s decrees. But that though the ultimate thing to strive for, cannot meet the world’s crisis of to-day any more than the ribs of an unfinished lifeboat in a boat-building plant can rescue the ship that is pounding the rocks.”

That lifeboat is for the future. Our job now is to rescue the sinking peoples with the best craft at hand, or one soon available, while we build the lifeboat for other times of need.

It is not my purpose to present here comprehensive or extended reasons in support of this ultimate realization. But it is quite in the range of proba-

bilities that the League of Nations Council, composed of eminent diplomats representing the greater nations, who must inevitably be influenced by political and selfish interests and considerations and each seeking to promote the advantage of his own nation, will in time suffer to a large degree the loss of its usefulness, if not be hopelessly disrupted by irreconcilable disagreements.

The same would be true of the Supreme Council of premiers, quite disassociated from the League, with which our Department of State is now sitting as a silent or merely an observing member, and also of any new association of nations.

Some form of big-brother influence and control is particularly necessary until peace is restored and it is made sure that the Treaty is not to be made a scrap of paper. It must continue until the new geographical lines are established and the infant nations born of the natural aspirations of the former subject peoples of the Central Powers and the favor of the Allies, are restrained from running amuck and supported until they will be able to walk alone. But it should survive in that form only so long as its work is necessary.

We lay down this proposition, then, as one of the steps in our approach to the question we wish to discuss in this chapter, that while it is admitted that either the existing League or some other association of nations is an immediate necessity to meet the present world crisis, it is equally true that founded as the League is and as any new association

of nations to achieve the same ends must be, upon principles of political expediency, neither can long satisfy the world or long endure.

Will it be possible to establish a supreme authority which will avoid all these objections—one that will safely protect the rights and interests of the weakest without harm to the great upon whose prosperity the well-being and happiness of all depend—one that will not be in constant danger of disruption by political clashes?

The world Court founded upon and governed by fixed and definite principles of international law, seems to offer the only method that will satisfy the conscience and command the respect of all nations and peoples.

With that supreme over all, the existing League or some other society of nations, might continue a useful existence. Indeed some manner of league or association of nations will always be necessary to maintain the Court's authority and enforce its decrees. It will also be required for the legislation that will be necessary for the revision of the old and the making of new international laws.

If it be limited to such enforcement and such legislation, and to the promotion of international arbitration and disarmament, sanitary regulations and other operations of beneficence, and to the offices of a general aid to the Court it can never become oppressive or in any dangerous or objectionable sense or degree a super-state.

The worst that has been said against the League

of Nations has been repeatedly said by its critics and opponents and particularly well said by Mr. Harding in the political campaign, that it proposes a government not of laws but of men; that controlled by politicians representing great nations each having enormous and conflicting world interests, its determinations will be influenced by considerations of expediency and national selfishness and rest upon the power of might, not of right.

If it is to live and efficiently serve the immeasurable interests of mankind it must be taken out of politics. Court and law point the only way by which it can be done.

But a disintegrating world calls for immediate action. The Court is not formed and if it were it could not in its infancy meet the unparalleled emergency. In view of this necessity and at the same time in view of the immediate need, and indeed in the existing unprecedented situation the absolute necessity, for a power more swift to act and restricted only by the opinion and the conscience of mankind, it may be worth while to consider if it would not be expedient and advisable to make *temporary* use of the machinery now in existence and operating for this very purpose (which, excepting the United States and the defeated Central Powers, has the support of the principal nations of the world) until such time as the better and greater realization can take form?

Thus our relationship to the League as now con-

stituted would be only for a limited time to meet a great crisis.

Since its political and super-state features present to our minds an insurmountable objection to its permanent continuance upon its present basis, would it not be possible and also wise to end it within a definite period, in so far as these features exercise control, by a reformation begun without and completed within?

With that idea accepted, the United States would enter it only with the understood purpose to exert open influence to take it out of politics, and retire its principles of expediency in favor of the principles of international law, and with a full understanding with the premiers and other statesmen of Europe that their active aid will be given to that realization.

Thus with the way opened by diplomacy, the United States would enter the existing League with such reservations as may be approved and with agreement in advance that our membership will cease at some definite time, say at the end of five years, unless within that time the political features and methods of expediency now controlling be superseded by a Permanent Court of International Justice, guided in its decisions by a complete and comprehensive code of international laws, and the chief function of the League be to enforce the Court's decrees.

But we would not relinquish the right to withdraw after two years, as provided in the Covenant.

Thus the world will escape the troublesome and risky unsettlement that would inevitably be associated with the delays and uncertainties of an attempt to form a new association. With the United States, under safe restrictions a member of the League, the greater and more disturbing questions requiring immediate settlement would soon be satisfactorily solved. The system of Court and law would begin to operate in a stabilized world with the way made safe for the successful launching of its great career and the ultimate and greater realization will have arrived in five years.

There would also be avoided the creation and maintenance of a rival association by the emergence of the existing Society into a very different and better thing than what it now is. Thus not only will the realization of Court and law supremacy have arrived, but our ideal of an association of nations will have arrived with it, in the only way by which it now seems it can be realized. I am therefore not contending so much for the League as I am for a wise entrance into what will be in practical effect a new Association of Nations, subordinate to Court and law.

With the progress now made and the United States a member, such a League ought to be able in that time to set the world sufficiently in order to enable Court and law to take over the world's difficult problems without too great a shock to old and established customs. With the League the enforcing officer, it should be able to hold in leash to an

extent that will insure the world's safety, the forces that would blindly wreck it.

Would that not be a diplomatic and wise way in which to accomplish our own desires? In diplomatic negotiations with the statesmen of Europe we would say to them, We will enter your League of Nations to aid you in solving the immediately pressing world problems, if you will agree to join with us in a gradual and safe transference of its powers to the authority of international court and law.

If instead of offering them something like this we insist that they abandon the League of Nations because it is founded upon principles of political expediency and join us in a society of nations which also must be founded upon principles of political expediency, would we not run not only the risk of failure to achieve anything, but in addition place ourselves in a position in which we will be in danger of becoming the laughing stock of the peoples of the world for our egotism and presumption? But we may with dignity and propriety and reasonable assurance of success, invite them to loftier peaks on their own mountain.

In view of all the circumstances in the case—in view of the fact that the forty-seven nations which compose the League, in joining it entered into a solemn undertaking that they would not thereafter enter into engagements inconsistent with the terms of its covenant, is there any other way by which they may be induced to join with us in association for the preservation of peace in accord with our ideals?

The engagement into which they entered is contained in Article XX of the Covenant and is as follows:

“The members of the League severally agree that this covenant is accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof, and solemnly undertake that they will not hereafter enter into any engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof.”

If they are debarred from entering into any engagements “inconsistent” with its terms, how can they enter into engagements which would compel them to abrogate all its terms and wholly abandon it? Their engagements constitute a binding agreement which can be abrogated only by the slow process of amendment as provided in the terms of the Covenant.

In view of that binding agreement they would not, they could not forsake their League to become members of a new and rival international society which we might undertake to set up. But they could and in all probability would agree to cooperate with us in remodelling their League to make it practically the association of nations of American conception.

Would not insistence that they scuttle the League craft which they have builded and launched and boarded and in which they are now sailing the international seas, to come aboard our ship be looked upon as a colossal assumption of importance, and subject us to rebuff, humiliation and total defeat?

Why run that risk when the result we seek may be achieved in a diplomatic, a dignified and gentlemanly way in at least ordinary deference to the views and sensibilities of our fellows?

If Mr. Harding and his able lieutenants and counsellors in his administration succeed in bringing into being that great creation (not the idea of this author, since Mr. Root, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Hoover and Mr. Taft, and likewise Mr. Harding himself have indicated strong leanings toward an international court), it will be by far the greatest single achievement of the wisdom of man since the world began. May the friends of world peace of all political faiths in our country and in all parts of the earth, unite in fervent prayer, earnest hope and supreme effort for that consummation.

To the end that the Court should be an effective instrument for the prevention of war and the assurance of international justice, it would seem essential that it should have compulsory jurisdiction. The omission to provide such authority in the system devised by the Hague Conference left the Court thus devised weak and impotent to achieve the ends for which it was erected. As Mr. Root has pointed out, arbitration of justiciable questions was not made obligatory so that no nation could bring another before the Court unless the defendant was willing to come, and there was no way to enforce a judgment.

In the plan for the Permanent Court of International Justice reported to the League of Nations by

the Root-Phillimore Commission, questions that were strictly "justiciable or judicial" were made subject to obligatory adjudication. But influenced by the representatives of Great Britain and France, the League Assembly voted that provision out. Thus there is still left the task and the responsibility to establish a Court which shall have the power necessary to such settlement of international disputes as will prevent war.

But had that power been conferred in the provisions establishing the Hague Tribunal, that Court would still be without any other than moral power, for there was no League or association of nations created to enforce its decrees.

Some such enforcing power would seem necessary to the effective authority of an international court.

Further, the economic boycott should be one of the penalties which by the world code of laws the Court would have the right to impose. But so severe a penalty should be applied only in an extreme case, against a nation which goes to war in violation of the plain precepts of international law.

These provisions would put "teeth in it." The campaign promise of Senator Harding to "put teeth" into the Court could have meant nothing less than compulsory jurisdiction and some such instrument of enforcement as the economic boycott.

To insure it power to compel obedience to law, the nations composing the League or association of nations should be bound by the compact to apply the boycott to an offending nation at the times, in

the manner and to the degree imposed by the Court. This would very frequently prove a hardship to the nations so complying, whose commerce would by such enforcement be seriously affected. But it would not be so great a hardship as to suffer their share of the burdens and perils resulting from continual disturbances of the world's peace and the need to be always prepared for war.

It would also be true that a faithful enforcement of the law would soon end the need to apply the boycott with the hardships to innocent nations resulting from its application, by bringing about the end of wars.

For President Harding to bring into being an international supreme court with compulsory jurisdiction and power to enforce its decrees by imposing the economic boycott, whether it be entirely of new origin or a making over of the Permanent Court of International Justice, would be to produce something so far in advance of an international court shorn of those effective powers that it would be to all practical purposes as an assurance of international justice and world peace, a new creation. It would be an American achievement and a development of constructive statesmanship so beneficent in its permanent results that its creators would forever be held in highest memory by a grateful world; an achievement which would give to another American a place among the immortals.

If in such temporary entry into the League of Nations, more than the Lodge reservations be required

to safeguard American independence or allay the fears of some important members of the American family, may I suggest a reservation that would draw without hurting the sharpest teeth of Article X, and satisfy the apprehensions existing in many minds while leaving us in effective membership in the League upon the temporary or conditional basis we have indicated?

As a preface to the suggestion and a preparation for its favorable reception, it may be said that, when proposed to a distinguished Republican member of the Senate soon after the Treaty was offered for the consideration and approval of that body, he wrote in reply, "Your amendment is a very excellent one and touches a very vital point." Some months later another Senator of importance wrote, "It may solve our problem for us," and another equally prominent, in writing his hearty approval, said that in the following week he would speak in its favor upon the floor of the Senate. But new developments and other moves in the Senate side-tracked it and, in so far as I have knowledge, the promised speech was not made.

The proposed reservation or amendment was in substance this: That no nation of the Western hemisphere shall be required to intervene in the Eastern hemisphere with military, or naval or economic force except in the event of an attack upon a member nation by so great a nation or combination of nations as would involve the peril of world war,

and then only upon certification by the Council that American intervention is of vital importance. After such certification, upon the advice of the President the Congress would consider and decide the question of our intervention as provided in the Constitution of the United States.

Thus, by this introduction of the hemispheric principle, we would avoid becoming involved in every scrap in Europe, Asia and Africa, and our aid will be given at the only time it will be needed,—when the emergency is great enough to require it. And it will be in keeping with the declared policy of this administration, not to interfere in the affairs of Europe.

A suggestion has been made by Mr. George L. Cade of New Rochelle, New York, of a reservation which is admirably expressed and may be in some respects better than mine. One possible advantage is that it applies to the United States and to no other nation of the Western hemisphere. It also omits all reference to the economic boycott. It is as follows:

The United States regards the enforcement of Article X, as far as it may apply to the eastern hemisphere, as primarily the province of the nations of that hemisphere, and it obligates itself under that article to furnish military or naval assistance only when in its judgment, as pronounced by act of its Congress then existing, the peace of the world is imperilled by a violation of that article.

The day when the manuscript for this volume was completed in unrevised form to this point there was given to the press the Pilgrim Dinner address of our Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Some of its declarations are not encouraging to the suggestion of even so much as a temporary cooperation with other nations in the League of Nations though it be only as a stepping stone to the better realization.

That suggestion was offered for whatever it may be worth, and merely as a stepping stone or vestibule to the permanent home. As such it will stand, and I will now say something more in its favor, with the risk of some repetition for emphasis.

It would be to enter not the same League that has been so roundly denounced and so thoroughly repudiated, but a reformed League,—partly reformed by the immediate operation of the terms of our entry and thoroughly reformed by the carrying out of previously made diplomatic engagements at the end of five years.

It would be a real victory and probably the only possible victory for the American idea of a new association of nations, except only in the unimportant matter of name.

And provided the association could be otherwise achieved, does it not offer the only possible way by which it may be realized without long and perilous delay and disagreeable encounters and caustic criticism? And would it not save a great deal of vastly important time in the settlement of Europe's peace, while achieving practically all that we are promising

to set out to do in much less time than we could otherwise hope to do it?

The expressions in this volume of a willingness to enter a new association of nations have invariably been made upon the very necessary condition that the greater nations of Europe agree to forsake the League and join us in it, for we cannot conceive of two rival associations of nations composed of the same members and working to the same ends. Do not the foregoing suggestions offer a reasonable way by which they may join us without such absolute and almost impossible forsaking, by the happy expedient of our joining them in the making over of their League in what will be to all intents and purposes our association of nations made agreeable both to their views and ours?

These things have been said without intimidation by Colonel Harvey's London declarations, for no pronouncement by his ambassador or by the President himself will decide his course against his own matured judgment and the logic of facts, if in any new situation the highest interests of our country and our world say otherwise.

Of the delightful delicacy and excellent good taste of Colonel Harvey's affirmations nothing need be said. The friends of world peace owe him an enormous debt of gratitude, for nothing could, at this time, have aroused the sentiment of the country in favor of their cause quite so much as have his indiscretions of speech. But against the pronouncement of our Ambassador, whether it has the sanction of

the President or not, we may put the authentic and often repeated (and none the less impressive because repeated) words of the President,—the League “amended and revised if it has been so entwined and interwoven into the peace of Europe that its good must be preserved.” Only time and the development of events can answer that “if.” Its answer must be decisive with President Harding whether it comes to-day or to-morrow.

If the answer favors the immediate formation of a new and permanent association of nations rather than a temporary use of existing machinery until the better can be brought into being, every good American citizen and every lover of peace should be satisfied. Only let some adequate and permanent thing be done while the unusual opportunity exists,—while the fresh and poignant memories of immeasurable losses and insufferable sorrows hold the minds and hearts of men in eagerness for it.

Another world war with all the horrors which new inventions of destruction must inevitably bring with it, is unthinkable. It must not be inflicted upon humanity. Half-way measures or temporary expedients cannot prevent world war nor the use of new engines of destruction inconceivably worse than the human race has yet been called upon to suffer. The world will hold in execration the leaders of our day, whether in America or Europe, who stand in the way of some adequate provision which shall make its recurrence improbable if not impossible.

To say that there is no danger of another world

war in view of the history of human selfishness, passions and ambitions, is nonsense. It is inevitable unless the wisdom and conscience of this generation provide against it. If not provided against and prevented only a few years will stand between us and the now gathering conflagration which will leave the world in ruins.

The Republican party platform, the consistent party record and the utterances of President Harding, in all of which the voter put his trust, unite in the most solemn pledge to join with other nations in making that adequate provision. In what way it is made, if effectually made, there is little need to care.

Disarmament separate and alone would not put an end to war nor greatly reduce the peril of world conflagration. There were wars and great wars when fleets were made of small sailing ships and galley oar boats and when the entire artillery of contending armies in the field could not discharge in a whole year as much deadly explosive as ten minutes of our world war hurled into space.

Disarm every nation upon the earth, not as a disarmament conference will do it, but completely, and let the world again grapple in deadly conflict, and there would appear as if over night, engines of destruction before which the combined armies of Alexander, Cæsar and Napoleon, armed as in their day, would fall back in terror or meet annihilation. Yet there were great and destructive world wars in their day.

War and world cataclysm can be prevented only by the joining of the greater nations of the earth in effective and permanently maintained measures and agencies to forbid them, behind which will stand the united conscience and determination of the enlightened peoples of the best of our civilization.

There must be a league or association of nations, or, far better, adequate international laws with a court competent to apply them, supported by united and adequate international power to sustain and enforce the court's decrees against any nation, however powerful, that would disturb the world's peace.

If it is true as Colonel Harvey says, that we went into the war solely for the United States, the need is as great that we go into the peace for the United States. But it is not true. We may have gone into the war primarily for defence, but not solely.

But there is here at home a manufactory of popular phrases more hurtful in their influence than are the indiscreet expressions of an ambassador, because more subtle. They are phrases that encourage the entire dismissal of the subject and the responsibility in a way often expressed by the man in the street in the self-excusing and self-satisfying remark, "We have enough to do at home, and it is better to let our neighbor take care of his own yard."

That is excellent good sense if used upon the right occasion and in reference to the right subject. But it is exceeding bad sense when used as its authors intend it to be used, upon the wrong occasion and

in reference to the wrong subject. If it means that when our neighbor's fence is afire, and in spite of his strenuous endeavors to stay it, the fire is beginning to take hold of his house and not only the smoke but some of the burning cinders are blowing into our yard, "we have enough to do at home and it is better to let him take care of his own yard," then there was no greater folly ever spoken.

But we ought to have and show some real interest in the fire in our neighbor's yard though the wind should not blow the smoke and the cinders our way. We went into the war in self-defence, but there is hardly an American soldier who went over the top who was not ennobled and who is not now exalted by the reflection that he fought for the redemption of the world. I would not take that ennobling consciousness from him nor rob him of the comforting satisfaction of handing it down to his children.

There is such a thing as American idealism. We went into the war to save America, but at the same time the nation thrilled with the spirit of brotherhood and the thought that we had gone to the rescue of imperilled liberty in France and to avenge Belgium's wrongs was large in the enthusiasm and consecrated the sacrifice of our sons whose bodies lie in Flanders fields.

There is American idealism; an idealism written not in words but in great historic acts, and it has not been excluded from the annals of Republican administrations. I write as a Republican to Republicans not because I am on this question in the least

degree a partisan. But Republicans are in power and it is in their hands and at their mercy and they should be spoken to.

American idealism introduced a new principle in world diplomacy when the Boxer indemnity was returned to China, and again when under rules of peace and magnanimous justice was made the voluntary payment of millions to the conquered nation for the Philippines that were ours by all the rules of war.

As normal human beings we have had thought for our own interests, it is true. When we went to war with Spain there was in the minds of practical statesmen the thought to rid our country of the menace of yellow fever that nested too close to our shores in unsanitary Havana. But that city could have been purified and kept clean at much less expenditure than war.

It was the thought of Cuba's wrongs and a near neighbor struggling to be free from foreign oppression, that fired the hearts of our people, and it will be to the everlasting glory of McKinley and American statesmanship that, responding to that sentiment of altruism, we went to her liberation in that supreme act of idealism while astonished Europe gaped in wonder as American blood and treasure were poured out not for American advantage but that Cuba might enter into freedom and opportunity.

Thus was written the brightest page in the history of world diplomacy in acts of ideal realism that may yet mark the opening of a new era in the di-

plomacy of nations in which the might of golden rule and not of arms or circumstance shall decide the fate of nations and peoples.

I hope my fellow-Republicans will not take offense at these references.

Our people have faith that history will write something like that as the idealism of Warren G. Harding, who has the greatest opportunity that has been given to a man since God entrusted to Abraham Lincoln the gift of freedom to a race.

To him and to Hughes and Hoover and others of his Cabinet, aided by other great Republicans and great Americans, we look for an idealism that will not expend itself in splendid visions, but will be builded into the world's enduring temple of peace and justice,—or it may be into a fortress upon whose banner will be inscribed, in words of good humor that do not detract from their grim determination, “We will have peace if we have to fight for it.”

Shall the practical idealism of our people now looking confidently to new leadership to build it into some structure which shall be of great and lasting benefit to the race, find through that leadership the expression for which it struggles? Or shall America, having by a great sacrifice of blood and treasure brought the world out of war, now fail the world in the hour of supreme opportunity to assure its peace?

ADDENDA

CONFIRMATION

ON the day following that upon which the manuscript for this book was prepared for submission to the publisher, the national society of the League to Enforce Peace (a non-partisan body) sent out a circular letter enclosing a well conceived and eminently wise paper entitled "The Present Program of the League to Enforce Peace," which is in striking conformity with the general trend of the views presented in the foregoing pages. Particularly and authoritatively, since it was prepared by eminent pro-League Republicans, it supports the views of the pro-League evolution as expressed in Chapter VIII. A copy of the paper here follows:

"This statement was framed by a sub-Committee consisting of George W. Wickersham, Chairman, William Howard Taft, A. Lawrence Lowell, Talcott Williams, Henry Van Dyke and Hamilton Holt. The Committee was appointed at a meeting of the Executive Committee held on April 23d by which the statement it drew up was approved on a referendum vote.

"The League to Enforce Peace was formed to secure the organization of a Society of Nations for

the preservation of world peace. It has supported every plan which seemed to it practicable for the accomplishment of this end. The only available means of realizing its aims in the near future rests with the present national administration. President Harding in his address to Congress on April 12th declared.

“ ‘The American aspiration, indeed, the world aspiration, was an association of nations, based upon the application of justice and right, binding us in conference and cooperation for the prevention of war and pointing the way to a higher civilization and international fraternity in which all the world might share.’

“We have noted with satisfaction the various steps already taken by the present administration in bringing the United States into closer cooperation with the various nations in the readjustment of world affairs. While the League to Enforce Peace supported the Covenant of the League of Nations as submitted to the Senate and afterwards the Covenant with the Lodge reservations, it will in accordance with its earnest purpose and previous efforts support any effective organization conceived for the general purpose of preserving peace and justice among nations through the establishment of a Court of International Justice, and machinery for conference and cooperation among nations to prevent misunderstandings and promote the general welfare of the world.

“We, therefore, urge all friends of an Association of Nations to give the President and Secretary Hughes every moral support in working out a plan which will accomplish these purposes.”

PROPOSAL OF A PRACTICAL TEST

(Which is next to the Most Important Chapter in the Book)

THE author would like very much to see in every church, high school, grammar school and chamber of commerce, and in important educational, religious, commercial, financial, industrial and labor organizations and assemblies, wherever practicable throughout the United States, a poll taken upon the following questions:

1. Should the United States refrain from joining any association of nations for the preservation of peace?

2. Should the United States enter the existing League of Nations with such modifications as were twice approved by the United States Senate, or such revision of them as the President and the Senate may now approve?

3. Should the United States become a party to the Root-Phillimore Permanent Court of International Justice adopted by the Assembly of the League and now referred to member nations for ratification? The United States is entitled to become a party to this Court without being a member of the League.

The results of such polls might be reported to the League to Enforce Peace, 22 West 19th Street, New York (this suggestion is without authority from that Society), and as far as possible to the newspapers and to the Associated Press. The results would accurately inform the President and the Senate as to the meaning of the people's mandate.

Such poll was taken by the National Economic League during the month of April 1921 with the following results: On the first question: 84% for joining some such association to 16% against; on the second question, to and including the words "the United States Senate, 61% for to 39% against; on the third question, 93% for to 7% against.

The author would be more than pleased (if it is not immodest to suggest it) if when practicable, that part of Chapter II which on page 29 begins "The Republican platform expression upon the question," and ends with "World peace and international justice," on page 33, be read to the audience and the Republicans present be asked to vote whether it is a fair presentation of the motives which influenced their vote for Harding.

DISARMAMENT

OF course President Harding intends to secure disarmament in an effective and practical way that will not risk the world's civilization to ambushed attack by barbaric foes, whether of Central or Eastern Europe or of Asia. The appeals for disarmament by influential bodies of citizens should be a material aid as an expression of American opinion. But resolutions in Senate and House demanding immediate and specific action are embarrassing and hurtful interference with the development of a peace plan which can be much more

effectively worked out as a whole, and tend in important particulars to defeat it.

The premature urging of them may, in the minds of some, be intended to embarrass and aid to defeat, not disarmament, but a comprehensive plan in alliance with other nations. Give Harding a chance to work out his plan.*

A very large measure of disarmament is not only much to be desired, but is imperative. Not only as a limitation of the peril of war, but to lift from the backs of men an intolerable load. But to disarm in disregard of proportionate disarmament by other nations would be not only inexcusable folly but deliberate national suicide, a dangerous invitation to war and a reprehensible betrayal of world freedom and civilization.

If in 1913 Great Britain had yielded to the demands of a stupidly blind pacifism and scrapped her navy and we, falling before the same logic of imbecility, had followed her example, the ides of 1914 would not have passed before Belgium and France would have fallen before the vandal hosts of Germany, England would have been the next to be crushed beneath her iron heel and our own Republic would scarcely now have emerged from a life and death struggle for national existence out of which nothing less than a miracle of grace could deliver us. It is only by the help of her saner friends that Liberty still lives upon the earth.

* These two paragraphs were written before the President's intention to call a Disarmament Conference had been made known.

But the highest and most enlightened world statesmanship and the noblest ideal-realism should now give themselves to the task to determine and achieve the largest possible world disarmament consistent with the safety of civilization and true world democracy.

It may be said in favor of general and enforced disarmament that it would solve the "yellow peril" problem by preventing China from becoming at some period in the future a great and menacing military power. The greater arguments in its favor are self evident and need no restatement here.

THE DEBTS OF THE ALLIES

WHAT impossible proposals are made when the best and wisest of people speak out of their hearts without taking time to make use of their heads! It would indeed be a generous and beautiful act to cancel the debts of our allies since for three years they fought our war without our aid, and it would much relieve the financial tension everywhere impeding a natural return to settled and prosperous conditions.

Since it would add all the cancelled billions to the burden of taxation upon the backs of our people, the altruism of the act cannot be questioned. But there is an objection far greater than the mere assumption of that burden, and one which vitally affects not only the interests but the safety of the entire world.

It is this.—If some time in the future there should be another war equal to or of greater magnitude than the one from which a sorely afflicted world has barely emerged, a war in which civilization is again put in peril and France and England again stand in the breach, there would be need to borrow from the United States twenty, perhaps forty billions, and upon the prompt success of that borrowing the world's future may easily hang.

In that situation, no matter how great the peril to ourselves that enlightened statesmen would see in it, no American administration and no American Congress would, with the experience of the former cancelled loans in memory, dare authorize it without first appealing to the opinion of the country for sanction.

With human nature what it is, and human foresight apt to be warped by supposed immediate material and other interests, is there any fair reason to believe that the sanction would be given without debate and loss of time that might hold it back until it would be too late, and civilization have perished while Europe waited for reply?

THE QUESTION PROPOSED BY THE NON-PARTISAN FIFTY
TO HARDING AND COX

THE “Non-Partisan Fifty” question proposed to Senator Harding and Governor Cox was as follows: “In the event two-thirds of the Senate fails to support a proposal for our union

with other nations for the preservation of peace more satisfactory to you, will you advise and support our entry into the existing League of Nations with the Lodge reservations, or such revision of them as two-thirds of the Senate may approve?"

The question was designed to make certain our entry into some association of nations whichever side won the election.

At Huntington, W. Virginia, and elsewhere, Governor Cox made a reply which practically committed him "as a party leader" to support President Harding should he seek our entry into the League or a new association of nations. The question was put prematurely to Senator Harding by the enterprising correspondent of a great newspaper, who elicited the reply that he would "not answer a hypothetical question." After it was explained to him that what was sought was not merely an answer to an hypothesis but a practical commitment by both sides to a definite action in a very probable situation, he said in one of his addresses what his most intimate friends in Ohio assured the author was practically an affirmative answer.

THE HISTORY OF AN APPEAL TO PRESIDENT WILSON AND THE SENATE

IN a foot note near the end of the first chapter the reader is referred to this Addenda for an account of an "earnest and importunate warning" to President Wilson. It was given in an "Ap-

peal to the President and to the Senate'' which the author took to Washington in March 1920, and in other representations made to Mr. Wilson at about that time.

The "Appeal" which was in effect that we enter the League of Nations upon the bases of agreement then possible and confine the election issue to the dispute over Article X, had the signed approval of more than two thousand men and women of national distinction, including hundreds of the most distinguished advocates of the League of Nations in the country, among whom were former members of President Wilson's Cabinet, governors of important states, some of the most popular presidential possibilities, university presidents, eminent prelates, great pastors and preachers and others who rank high as leaders in statesmanship, commerce, industry and finance allied with both of the greater political parties and of all shades of opinion as to the reservations with which they preferred that the Treaty should be ratified. They were willing to waive individual and partisan preferences that we might enter the League through any reasonable compromise. Among them were some of Mr. Wilson's most intimate friends.

What was then presented to President Wilson was something more than an appeal. It was the suggestion of an idea,—rather it was the proposal of a plan. In the then existing situation it meant simply that the President accept the only compromise then obtainable and determine our entry into the League

of Nations with what were known as the Lodge reservations but which in fact were the product of the McCumber-Lodge compromise by which all the amendments together with the destructive Reed reservation were defeated, and others later much improved.

It could not be truthfully said that the plan called upon the President to make all the compromise, since as far back as November 19th, 1919, the Republican majority in the Senate in response to the demand of McCumber, Colt, Lenroot, McNary, Kellogg and their associates made those vastly important compromises and renewed the proposal in March 1920, when on the proposal of Senator Lodge the objectionable features of the preamble were eliminated and other desirable changes made.

Once in the League upon that basis we could not thereafter, by any referendum to the people or by any act of President and Senate in response thereto make those reservations worse, for the simple reason that once we are in the League no change could be made in them without the consent of the other nations united with us in Covenant, and they would not agree to any unfavorable change. But they could be made more satisfactory to them or withdrawn, if that be the people's will, for to this the other nations would readily agree.

Thus the United States would be without recall, except by withdrawal after two years which by the terms of the Covenant is the right of every member nation, a part of the League of Nations, the recipi-

ent of all its benefits and responsible to it to the extent which the reservations would permit.

But President Wilson would not have said his last word. He would have the same right as before to appeal to the country through the platform of his party or the declarations of the party candidate for the election of a president and senate favorable to the withdrawal of those reservations entire, thus leaving us in the League upon the same basis as the other nations, or he could make it the clean-cut issue to so modify one of them as would leave the moral obligation in Article X. Nor would the Republican leaders, object to fight it out on that issue.

That was the plan,—to secure to a distressed world without longer delay and without any uncertainty, the half a loaf of relief which both sides to the controversy were willing to give, and confine the election issue to the points of irreconcilable disagreement.

But what would the friends of the League of Nations gain by this entry of the United States into the League? Just this:—The provisions for a comprehensive code of international laws and the creation of a Permanent Court of International Justice as provided in Articles XIV and XV would be in full force in the Covenant, together with qualified provisions for arbitration and disarmament and other provisions of great value. The chief and most valuable of all would be the economic boycott provided in Article XVI, the most powerful instrument in all the Covenant for the preservation of peace, the one

most ready for use and which avoids all the sacrifices of war. It could not be enforced to guarantee the territorial integrity of other member nations against external aggression as provided in Article X except by specific act of Congress, but it could be invoked to preserve peace as provided in Article XVI.

The United States once in the League of Nations could be depended upon to go all the necessary lengths for the preservation of world peace and the assurance of international justice, and would exert a powerful influence in making over again the League of Nations upon a broader and juster foundation. The spirit of fairness and pride of her people would make that certain.

There would then remain before the President and the Senate and the American people for settlement, only the questions upon which immediate agreement seemed impossible, chiefly this,—Should the Senate reservations by this compromise adopted and put in force as affecting Article X remain in force or be withdrawn? Or should they be modified? And if modified, in what way? They could not be made more drastic or destructive of the provisions of the Covenant for the reason stated in a former paragraph.

The Irish Resolution was necessarily excluded, first, because the great majority of the signatures to the appeal were attached before the passage of that Resolution in the Senate; and second, because the other nations signatory to the Covenant would

refuse to admit us into the League of Nations with a reservation which, whatever may be said of its merits, would be an unwarranted and unprecedented interference in the internal affairs of a member nation.

Every effort was made to convince the president and the Senators that to persist in making the vital question of our entry into the League of Nations an issue in the 1920 political campaign would be to take tremendous risks, because, first, before the expiration of the second year when the elected candidates of the winning party in the election could take their seats (for careful computation seemed to show that at least two elections would be required to sufficiently change the complexion of the Senate to reverse its then attitude) and the remaining nearly one year more in which the question could be threshed out all over again, if indeed a two-thirds vote of the Senate could then be assured to make it final, the world and we with it might go to ruin for the lack of our aid; and because, second, in a heated partisan political campaign with all the counter currents of irrelevant prejudices, personal ambitions and partisan interests and designs, it should be plain to any thoughtful mind that the entire question might go wrong and fall lifeless by the wayside against the actual desire of the people.

There was left in this "plan" the one and only way by which these risks might be avoided. Though called "a plan," it was a way so simple, so reasonable, so manifestly fair and so easily workable and

effective to achieve the end desired without the compromise of any worthy interest by either side to the controversy, that it seemed to its advocates that no friend of the League of Nations could possibly oppose it or put the least obstacle in its way. Yet a Lodge Republican could consistently approve it.

It was made plain that under it the President could take his referendum if that be his desire, without the great risk of our being kept out of the League of Nations altogether against the actual will of the people through the question being obscured by entirely irrelevant questions of party advantage or of personal popularity, or by an election fluke, and without the great personal risk of his being subjected to the charge, though it be an unjust one, of being willing to subordinate his friendship for the League of Nations and the sacred interests of mankind involved in it to personal ambition or to partisan gain.

The Appeal as presented to the President and the Senate did not advocate any referendum whatever, but suggested a referendum upon limited and subordinate questions as infinitely preferable to one that would stake the vital question of our entering the League of Nations and the immeasurable interests involved in it upon a hazardous gamble. It was held that an enemy of the League of Nations might consistently take that risk. Not so a friend. Therefore the President's hearty acceptance when led to give to this proposal his serious consideration was confidently expected. For why should he choose the

certainly of long and injurious delay and the risk of all, when a full half might be instantly gained and the other half placed in no greater doubt by the act?

The plan seemed to say, "Please give at once to a hungry world the half loaf now ready, and do not continue unnecessary strife for the whole loaf while the world starves, with the risk that you may destroy the whole loaf and have left for the starving peoples no bread at all."

The "Appeal to the President and to the Senators," stated the particular proposal, which I have characterized as a "plan" in two short paragraphs. It was presented at the White House on March 29th, more fully stated in the "inclosing letter" signed by Cardinal Gibbons, S. Homer Woodbridge and the author. It was also outlined in very complete form in subsequent reasoned statements.

Arriving in Washington the very day of the rejection of the Treaty by the Senate, all but one of the few friends who had come with it felt that it had better not be presented. But many encouraging telegrams and the mandates of its hundreds of important signatures could not be ignored. The leading press association and newspaper authorities had given more discouragement by the advice that, since it was "propaganda," it could receive no newspaper publicity. But the reasonableness and persuasiveness of its own appeal so captured the imagination and won the hearts of avowedly hostile newspaper correspondents that, to the astonishment of its friends it received columns of favorable publicity

in the leading newspapers of the country which a million dollars could not have bought.

A few days later, the "plan" fully outlined and offered to the representatives of the press merely in a letter as an "Appeal to the People of the United States," was given the same unusual publicity, evidently induced by its own winning power. Then, in response to the advice of some of its friends not present in Washington, who thought it was receiving too much publicity, it was presented to the Senate without a newspaper correspondent present to give it a line, large publicity plans designed to give opportunity for a popular uprising of sentiment in its favor were abandoned and personal efforts to make the plan effective took their place.

This decision was much regretted by some who were strong in the belief that continued publicity would have brought forth such an overwhelming response in its favor as would have compelled its adoption.

It was represented to his friends that should the President return the Treaty to the Senate with the understanding that with whatever reservations it should be ratified (or he might limit it to the Lodge reservations) he would submit it to the other governments signatory to it, the act would greatly strengthen his position before the country in that it would completely dissipate as baseless the charges of inordinate stubbornness, partisanship and selfish subordination of the League of Nations to his own ambitions.

The act would succeed in putting us into the League, for the Senate majority could not refuse compliance since it would be an acceptance of their own terms, and they would know that refusal would be a humiliating and damaging stultification which they could not justify before the country.

In taking into consideration the chances for the success of this proposal the fact was not overlooked that President Wilson had not in any of his declarations in favor of making the League an issue in the approaching national election, either said or intimated that he would not be willing to limit the election issue to Article X. On the contrary, there was believed to be much ground for the belief that he would agree to that limitation of the issue for the sake of making safe the world's "half loaf" of relief.

It was thought that all these considerations made the appeal an irresistible one to his mind, and since it was apparent that both he and the Republican leaders had determined to make the League an election issue, it was believed that this partial yielding to his desire for the referendum offered the only possible hope to save the entire vital question from the risks of a partisan political campaign and secure the early entrance of the United States into the League of Nations.

Intimate friends of Mr. Wilson were induced to join in the endeavor to persuade him, for the sake of his League of Nations and as the last hope for his success in the world peace movement of which he

was the natural and providential leader to accept the compromise proposal. The author wrote, among others, to a very intimate friend and former classmate of the President along these lines, urging him to see Mr. Wilson in person and urge that course. He half expected a reproving reply to the effect that the President was abundantly able to attend to his own affairs and needed no advice either from friends or from outsiders. Instead he received the encouraging answer, "I am taking under very serious consideration the suggestion in your letter. Keep up your good work." A few days later the author met the recipient of the letter who referring to it said, "I expect to see the President next week, and I may be there at the psychological moment."

Both sides of the Senate stood ready upon a favorable hint from the President to put the compromise into effect and enter the League of Nations. The prevailing Republican view was expressed by Senator Smoot who, in the absence of Senator Lodge at the time, had proposed to him by the author this question, "If President Wilson and the Democratic Senators, even at this late date, show a willingness to ratify the Treaty with the Lodge reservations, will the Republican Senators join to put it through?" His instant reply was, "We will. But we will go no farther. That is going quite far enough."

On the Democratic side Senator Underwood, immediately after his selection as the Democratic Senate leader, said in a public interview that he intended

to take to the president an appeal signed by Democratic senators, requesting him to meet the Republicans in compromise and take us into the League of Nations. But nothing more was ever heard of it. Apparently a hint from the White House cooled the Senators' ardor.

The hopeful effort failed. The only response from the White House was a great silence. The President's "solemn referendum" was taken. The world knows the result.

Perhaps Mr. Wilson's illness and resulting isolation, putting him out of touch with the people and in unfortunate ignorance of the real situation, explains why he failed the country and the world in that hour of supreme opportunity. Perhaps our appeal failed to get fairly before him.

WOODROW WILSON—AN APPRECIATION AND A CRITICISM

I HAVE criticised Mr. Wilson, I believe justly. What I have written and what I may further write in this volume in his praise or censure has been and will be confined to his part in the world war and in world peace. The criticism has been said in preceding pages. Little beside praise will follow here. It will not be in the form of a fine analysis of his good qualities and great abilities, but a simple recalling to memory of great and indisputable facts.

When a small boy the author heard Abraham Lincoln (of whom he was a great admirer and intense partisan), speak in warm praise of an eminent

political antagonist who had unkindly, unjustly and mercilessly criticised him. What was the youth's amazement to hear Lincoln laud his most dangerous and implacable foe as a great orator and debater and a statesman whose genius honored his state and country! But when he proceeded with keen and humorous analysis, to tear his enemy's arguments to fragments and scatter them like pieces of waste paper before an amused and delighted audience, a new light came into the boy's mind and he saw that there was a vast difference between personal resentment and disagreement, between abuse and forceful argument. He also saw that greatness could be broad and generous.

Perhaps the early and deep impression made by that to him astounding object lesson may explain why the youth, now come to years of more than maturity, is incapable of understanding how the fact that men differ politically or strongly disagree in important or even vital matters, can justify the smallness, the lack of broadness of mind if not of common fairness, that cannot see any good in a man twice chosen by the people to the highest place in their gift, still held in the highest honor by millions of his countrymen and credited with greatness and achievements of greatness by gifted men and women in every part of the world.

One would think that any real American of any party would rejoice and be proud if any other American, whether in leadership of his or another party, should by any worthy achievement take and hold a

place in history near to that of Washington and Lincoln.

Such might have been Woodrow Wilson's achievement, such his place in the hall of fame but for inability to forego a part of what he sought to achieve that he might win for the benefit of mankind the greater the essential part, which would have crowned him with immortality. That he took a gambler's risk and lost is cause more for sorrow than for censure. The cause for censure lies only in this, that in taking that chance he risked not alone his own place in history, but the immeasurable interests of all the world.

Much may be said in his praise. Passing by what seems to some of us a deplorable tardiness in entering the war, it may be said that the conduct of America's part in the war, with due weight given to all the criticism which it excited, was a great and marvelous achievement which any amount of criticism cannot belittle. It is unnecessary to go into details. The great outstanding and glorious facts are known to all the world and written in indelible history.

The achievement of securing the united support of the country in the war, the speed with which was drafted, mobilized, trained and transported to France and to Flanders a great and invincible army, the army's valorous and decisive part in a quick ending of the war in victory for our great cause in the most stupendous struggle ever known and the

notable achievements of our great navy will forever be precious and proud American memories which cannot be disassociated from the memory of Woodrow Wilson.

Along with the achievements of the allied armies and navies, it cannot be denied that by his fourteen points, despite all criticism, he gained the moral leadership of the world and lost it only through political opposition and political defeat at home.

It can hardly be denied that by the sheer force of his ideas and his unequalled power to put into words the unexpressed sentiments of the heart of mankind, he so enfeebled the war morale of the victorious Central Powers that it broke in their disastrous defeat and surrender before the united valor of the allied armies. To the might of his pen must be ascribed an appreciable share in the quick and righteous ending of the war.

His great part in bringing more than forty nations, including, with the exception of our own and the defeated Central Powers, all the great nations of the world into organized union to assure the world's future peace was almost as large an accomplishment as our great part in ending the unparalleled world war. Whatever the defects in the League of Nations, it is the beginning of a united world effort to organize the nations in determined opposition to the intolerable curse of war, a beginning which cannot fail to ultimate in better understanding and better cooperation among the nations,

while it is the greatest concrete expression of world idealism ever known.

Only failure to win the support of his own countrymen in that society of nations, stood in the way of its becoming, despite its large defects, the greatest single human achievement in history. Only that failure, for which it may be said he is himself responsible, stands between him and a place in history beside the first American immortals.

His glory will never be as great as it would be but for that failure to achieve through wise concession. But with fair allowance for that failure, and fair deductions for his failure to lead his country earlier to the rescue of imperiled liberty in France and the defence of imperiled civilization, despite all the criticisms that may be heaped upon him whether by disappointed friends of his cause or implacable and unreasonable foes, and whatever worthier thing may follow and transcend his League of Nations, what was achieved in that beginning under his administration can never be taken from him but will forever be his crown of glory; not so bright a crown as it might have been, but still bright and luminous and one of the prides of Americans in coming ages.

It may be added that that does not detract one iota from the opportunity given to Warren G. Harding to make through the achievement of a better realization of world union for the preservation of peace an equal or a better place in world history.

MORE THAN STRAWS

SOMETHING more than straws which show which way the wind blew at election time and in the few months of the campaign, are the records of university and college student votes in student "presidential nominating conventions" at Harvard, Yale and many other universities and colleges. The record fails to appear in the body of the book because of an unfortunate accident by which the author's notes on the subject were lost.

It will scarcely be disputed that the student voters in general represented the best, most intelligent and most influential American families. Their votes must be accepted as a fair indication of the sentiments of the homes from which they came.

Even now I am without the exact figures of the votes at individual student conventions, but I am sure that memory does not play me false when I say that the Republican votes at Yale, Harvard and Cornell were so overwhelmingly for the three leaders who favored going into the League of Nations, namely Hoover, Wood and Lowden, that there was left for the one irreconcilable, Hiram Johnson, so few votes that he was practically out of the running. It may be added that the votes of the students of those institutions were fair samples of the student vote generally, and Western institutions were not one whit behind.

But I am not without a reliable record of the total

student vote in the 410 institutions in which it was recorded and compiled.

The total vote was.....	158,088
Those favoring compromise to promote immediate ratification were.	61,494
Those favoring the Treaty and Covenant without change.....	48,232
Those expressing themselves in accord with the large program.....	27,970
Those favoring killing the Treaty and League	13,943
(less than one-eleventh of the whole)	

If we add to these those who would negotiate a new treaty with Germany 6,449 158,088 there would appear to be 20,292 opposed to the League, or a little more than one-eighth of the whole.

It may be safely said that the pro-German and anti-British vote would account for nearly all that very meagre anti-League vote, and not all the anti-League vote was for Johnson.

What then becomes of the bold claim that the national vote was in favor of "scrapping the League?"

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
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